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CIVIL RIGHTS, CHARTER SCHOOLS, AND LESSONS TO BE 
LEARNED 
Derek W. Black∗ 
Abstract 
Two major structural shifts have occurred in education reform in the 
past two decades: the decline of civil rights reforms and the rise of 
charter schools. Courts and policy makers have relegated traditional 
civil rights reforms that address segregation, poverty, disability, and 
language barriers to near irrelevance, while charter schools and policies 
supporting their creation and expansion have rapidly increased and now 
dominate federal policy. Advocates of traditional civil rights reforms 
interpret the success of charter schools as a threat to their cause, and, 
consequently, have fought the expansion of charter schools. This Article 
argues that the civil rights community has misinterpreted both its own 
decline and the rise of charter schools. Rather than look for external 
explanations, civil rights advocates should turn their scrutiny inward. 
And rather than attack charter schools, they should learn from them. 
A close examination of past civil rights movements in education 
reveals that their decline was inevitable. Each of the various educational 
movements depended on establishing a causal connection between the 
reform sought and positive student outcomes. But precisely establishing 
causal connections in education is nearly impossible. Education 
involves too many variables to isolate conclusively the effects of 
educational policies on student outcomes. Ignoring this reality leaves 
civil rights reforms vulnerable to contraction. This weakness—not 
competition from charter schools—continues to undermine civil rights 
reform. 
Charter schools suffer from the same causal weakness, but it is not 
impeding their expansion because the charter movement, unlike civil 
rights, is not based primarily on evidence. Instead, charter school 
advocates emphasize ideological values that appeal to broad 
constituencies. These value-based constituencies form a movement that 
forces the expansion of charter schools and is undeterred by evidentiary 
critique. To regain relevance, civil rights advocates must scale back 
their reliance on evidentiary claims and reframe their arguments in 
terms of compelling values that can again inspire a movement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, educational civil rights advocates have felt the 
policy world shift underneath their feet. One of the primary factors in 
this shift has been the increasing prevalence of charter schools and 
favorable policies encouraging their continual expansion. Since the late 
1990s, when charter schools numbered only in the hundreds,1 charter 
schools have grown exponentially. Today there are over five thousand 
charter schools in operation,2 serving over two million children.3  
                                                                                                                     
 1. U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM: 
YEAR ONE EVALUATION REPORT iii (2000). 
 2. Schools Overview, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (2011), 
http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/year/2011; see also CTR. FOR RESEARCH 
ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 9 
(2009). 
 3. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., BACK TO SCHOOL TALLIES: ESTIMATED 
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While not the initial driving force behind this trend, federal policy 
has increasingly supported it and is now a leading advocate. When 
Congress enacted the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), 
charter schools were still operating at the margins of educational policy 
and were largely relegated to a footnote in federal law.4 Less than a 
decade later, charter schools dominate the policy world. In 2009, the 
U.S. Secretary of Education stressed that states that “put artificial caps 
on the growth of charter schools will jeopardize their applications under 
the [$4.35 billion] Race to the Top Fund.”5 Many states responded by 
immediately dropping their resistance to charters and eliminating caps 
on the number of charter schools they would authorize.6 Today, the 
fascination with charter schools has become so intense that charter 
schools are effectively sucking all the air out of reform conversations 
and limiting the discussion of other reform options. Other reform 
policies are, at worst, ignored and, at best, measured based on their 
consistency with a charter school agenda.7 
The growth and increasing relevance of charter schools has roughly 
coincided with the decreasing relevance of traditional civil rights 
reforms. As a result, advocates for racial, ethnic, and disability equality 
in education have understandably perceived charter schools as the 
enemy. Leading researchers and advocates have charged that charter 
schools are more racially and socioeconomically segregated than 
regular public schools, and that they routinely discourage the enrollment 
of students with language or disability needs.8 Charter school advocates 
                                                                                                                     
NUMBER OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS & STUDENTS, 2011–2012 at 1 (Dec. 2011) 
www.publiccharters.com/ publication/?id=637. 
 4. The only mention of charter schools in the main provisions of the Act are to indicate 
that they are an acceptable option for students exercising the voluntary transfer provision and an 
acceptable method for restructuring a school in need of improvement. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006).  
 5. David Nagel, Charter School Support Is a Prerequisite for Race to the Top Funds, 
THE JOURNAL (June 09, 2009), http://thejournal.com/articles/2009/06/09/charter-school-support-
is-a-prerequisite-for-race-to-the-top-funds.aspx. 
 6. See, e.g., Rob Christensen, Perdue Signs Law Lifting Cap on Charter Schools, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (June 17, 2011) (discussing North Carolina’s elimination of its cap on charter 
schools), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/06/17/1281607/perdue-signs-law-lifting-cap-on.html. 
 7. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV 257, 270, 
280 (1999). 
 8. See generally ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT 
EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS (2010) 
(criticizing charter schools and revealing the rift between charter advocates and civil rights 
advocates). There are charter schools whose mission is to serve students who speak English as a 
second language, see generally Alexandra Villarreal O’Rourke, Picking up the Pieces after 
PICS: Evaluating Current Efforts to Narrow the Education Gap, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 263, 
274–75 (2008), but those schools are the exception rather than the rule, and are technically 
segregated as well. 
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respond that civil rights advocates are unfairly comparing charter 
schools to all public schools, rather than to public schools in the 
particular neighborhoods where charter schools are located.9 In 
addition, charter school supporters assert that the racial and 
socioeconomic characteristics of charters are secondary to the real goal 
of expanding quality education for disadvantaged students.10 In short, 
segregation is irrelevant if students are receiving a higher quality of 
education in charters.11 As to the latter point, civil rights advocates 
counter that most charter schools are not delivering the improved 
academic outcomes they promise and fall short of the opportunities that 
integrated middle-income schools could offer.12  
This line of attack by civil rights advocates, even if reasoned, misses 
the point. First, it draws civil rights advocates into a battle against 
charter schools, rather than one for civil rights. This battle is 
counterproductive regardless of the winner, but the recent trajectory of 
charter schools suggests that charter schools will be the winner by a 
large margin.13 Second, the truth is that most educational civil rights 
were marginalized long before the rise of charter schools for reasons 
related to their own shortcomings. The United States Supreme Court 
placed major limitations on desegregation as early as the 1970s and 
effectively ensured its end in the 1990s;14 lower courts established 
standards for English Language Learner claims that assured their 
ineffectiveness just a few years after Congress passed the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act;15 the focus on individual remedies in 
special education law narrowed its impact from the outset;16 and courts 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Gary Ritter et al., A Closer Look at Charter Schools and Segregation, EDUC. NEXT, 
Summer 2010, at 69, 69.  
 10. Melanie Smollin, Should Segregated Charter Schools Integrate? Does it Matter That 
Their Schools are Segregated?, TAKE PART (June 10, 2011), http://www.takepart.com/node/178 
33/actions (reporting that KIPP charter schools’ Los Angeles Executive Director does not think 
segregation in charter schools matters). 
 11. Id. 
 12. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CHARTER SCHOOLS THAT WORK: ECONOMICALLY 
INTEGRATED SCHOOLS WITH TEACHER VOICE 8 (2010); see also Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White 
Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 599, 644 (2011). 
 13. See generally Molly Peterson, Charter Schools Gain Support from 64% of U.S. Adults 
in Survey, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=aWRZ1.Y3s9Jo (reporting that a majority of Americans support charter 
schools despite confusion about charter schools). 
 14. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 499 
(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 
752 (1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 (1973). 
 15. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1001 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 16. Cf. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public 
Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education 
Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 430 (2001) (arguing for 
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have demanded evidence of a causal connection between money and 
student outcomes in school finance litigation that litigants have 
struggled to establish.17 Given this reality, attacks on charter schools are 
misdirected, and they distract civil rights advocates from asking the 
important question of why their own reforms have waned while charter 
schools are gaining strength.  
The answer is that civil rights reforms have not failed because 
charter schools, or any other policy for that matter, have undermined 
them. Rather, education reform litigation across the various paradigms 
has consistently failed because the movements share a central flaw: the 
inability to establish a precise causal connection between educational 
policy and inputs on the one hand and student outcomes on the other.18 
When advocates increasingly focus their movements on legal claims 
premised on causal connections, advocates set themselves up for failure. 
Not recognizing this harsh reality, civil rights advocates simply press 
for better evidence. But better evidence cannot be found because the 
particular causal gaps that plague educational civil rights reform are 
inherent in the educational process itself. Thus, pursuing educational 
reform primarily through litigation and evidence-based arguments 
leaves traditional civil rights reforms perpetually vulnerable to 
contraction because the evidentiary gaps endemic to those movements 
can be exposed any time courts or policy makers care to scrutinize 
them.  
Ironically, from an evidentiary point of view, charter schools have 
had far more to overcome than civil rights advocates. Charter school 
advocates have asserted that they could improve student outcomes.19 
They have pointed to the purported failure of past reform policies to 
demonstrate that the system is broken and that the bureaucratic 
stranglehold on education makes it incapable of change from within.20 
They have argued that school choice, market forces, and the flexibility 
that charters can bring to education would foster efficiency, innovation, 
and educational quality that would improve student outcomes.21 But 
nearly two decades into the charter school movement, the pedagogy of 
charter schools has yet to demonstrate a significant causal effect on 
student outcomes. While a small percentage of charter schools 
                                                                                                                     
alternative avenues of relief for IDEA violations because of the disproportionate impact on low-
income students of color due to the focus on individual remedies).  
 17. See infra Section II.C. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. Pearl Rock Kane & Christopher J. Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of 
Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 203, 205 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001). 
 20. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 3 
(1990). 
 21. Kane & Lauricella, supra note 19, at 210–30.   
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outperform public schools, most do not. Forty-six percent of charter 
schools perform at the same level as public schools and 37% perform at 
a level significantly below public schools.22 Only 17% of charter 
schools actually outperform their local public schools.23 Thus, the data 
“reveals in unmistakable terms that, in the aggregate, charter students 
are not faring as well as their [traditional public school] counterparts.”24  
Yet the trajectory of charter schools stands in stark contrast to that 
of civil rights reforms. Charter schools suffer from their own 
evidentiary weaknesses, but they have not yet fallen victim to the 
general trend of reform failure in civil rights. Charter schools have 
succeeded where civil rights advocates, as of late, have failed because 
charter school advocates have built a movement that appeals to values 
and interests that do not rest on an evidentiary showing alone. At the 
broadest level, charter schools are a “movement” in every sense of the 
word, while traditional civil rights reforms have been reduced to 
evidentiary claims. And insofar as the evidence for traditional civil 
rights reforms is no worse and often better than the evidence for charter 
schools,25 the absence of a “movement” would appear to have little to 
do with the efficacy of the reform. That is not to say that evidence is 
irrelevant, but that evidence alone is insufficient, as it is only one of 
several relevant considerations. Recognizing this, charter school 
advocates have built a movement based on political and ideological 
claims as much as evidentiary claims. The expansion of charter schools 
thus demonstrates that a strong value-based movement can render weak 
evidence linking educational policy to increased student outcomes 
irrelevant. In this regard, charter school advocates can teach educational 
civil rights advocates so much.  
In particular, charter schools appeal to two important ideological 
values that sustain them regardless of their results: individual autonomy 
                                                                                                                     
 22. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 2, at 3. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 6. 
 25. For instance, one of the most consistent social science findings of the past several 
decades is the positive effect of socioeconomic integration on achievement. JAMES S. COLEMAN 
ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21–22 (1966) [hereinafter COLEMAN REPORT]; 
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH 
PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 6, 47–76 (2001); Geoffrey Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and 
Inequality: A Multilevel Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity Data, 112 
TCHRS. COLL. REC. 1201 (2010); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: 
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1355–56 (2004); Russell 
W. Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Segregation Still Matter? The Impact of Social 
Composition on Academic Achievement in Southern High School, 107 TCHRS. COLL. REC. 1999, 
1999 (2005). Though not as strong, a solid basis exists to show that money affects educational 
opportunities. See generally Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational 
Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1476–79 (2007). 
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and free market mentality.26 Ultimately, some parents and advocates 
care little about whether charter schools on the whole are successful or 
even whether their own charter school is more successful than their 
local public school. What they desire is self-determination.  Thus, the 
power to control their children’s educational choices has value in and of 
itself.27 In effect, a qualitatively worse education in a school of their 
choosing is preferable, if not superior, to a similar education in a school 
not of their choosing.28 Interests in individual autonomy intersect with 
business interests that adhere unflinchingly to the market’s ability to 
respond to consumer needs and choice, which they believe will 
necessarily produce better schools.29 That many charters are low-
performing now is irrelevant. The market will replace them over time 
with better schools.  
The power of these two ideologies has built a constituency that 
demands charter expansion regardless of the underlying data and 
evidence. While educational civil rights once leveraged moral- and 
value-based claims, that focus has been lost over the years. Civil rights 
reforms now are more often a battle of evidence and social science in 
the courts or policy preference in legislative processes. As a result, 
educational civil rights remain vulnerable to perpetual constraints by the 
causal gaps that inherently exist in education. In contrast, charter 
schools gain influence despite the lack of an evidentiary basis to support 
them. Likewise, civil rights advocates’ assertions of evidentiary 
superiority in comparison to charters have little, if any, effect on the 
policy conversation. In short, the civil rights and charter school 
movements are operating on two different levels: an evidentiary one 
that boxes civil rights advocates into failure and a value-based one that 
offers charter schools a chance for success.  
If educational civil rights are going to have any significant relevance 
in the future, it will not come from attacking charter schools or 
marshalling better evidence; it will come from following charter 
schools’ strategic lead and recognizing that past civil rights victories in 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note 20 (discussing individual autonomy and free 
market mentality as applied to public and private schools). 
 27. See Jack Buckley & Mark Schneider, Are Charter School Parents More Satisfied with 
Schools? Evidence from Washington, DC, 81 PEABODY J. EDUC. 57, 58 (2006); Danielle Holley-
Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District Act and New Orleans’ Charter 
Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 147 (2007) (explaining that some support charter schools 
because of the “parent driven school governance”). 
 28. Cf. Argun Saatcioglu et al., Parental Expectations and Satisfaction with Charter 
Schools Evidence from a Midwestern City School District, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 428, 432–
33 (noting that parents of children enrolled in charters are likely satisfied with a school of their 
own choosing, even if its academic programs are lacking).  
 29. See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and 
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L. J. 814, 819 (2011). 
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education were as much, if not more, a product of the moral claims they 
asserted as any substantiating evidence. School desegregation, in 
particular, is a perfect example of the relevance of extrajudicial 
movements and claims. Desegregation was initially grounded in far 
more than legal doctrine. In its earlier stages, desegregation was a 
movement within and without courts that was also grounded in morals 
and politics.30 During that period, courts were more than willing to 
ignore causal gaps in plaintiffs’ claims and resolve uncertainties in 
plaintiffs’ favor.31 But once desegregation’s moral claim receded and its 
popular movement fractured, it quickly fell victim to evidentiary battles 
that it could not win.32 If charter schools can teach civil rights advocates 
anything, it is that they must begin once again to frame their claims in 
ways that appeal to moral- and value-based sentiments. Otherwise, 
educational civil rights reforms will remain subject to the inherent 
evidentiary limits of education that will perpetually doom them. 
Currently, it is far from clear that educational civil rights advocates 
even recognize the common and inevitable source of their failure: the 
uncertain causal connection between educational policy and educational 
outcomes. Part I of this Article forces this realization to the fore by 
canvassing the major educational civil rights reform movements and 
identifying the specific causal assertions on which each was premised. 
Part I reveals that the claims of each movement share a common 
weakness and that, while courts may overlook these weaknesses for a 
period of time, external events eventually arise that encourage the 
exploitation of these weaknesses and the end of reform. Part II responds 
to those who would press for better evidence and social science under 
the belief that past failures are a result of evidentiary anomalies. This 
second Part demonstrates that a purely evidentiary-based approach to 
education reform results in inevitable failure because the nature of 
education is not susceptible to evidentiary certainty. Rather, causal gaps 
are inherent to education. After establishing these predicates that 
demand a new strategy, the Article in Part III examines how charter 
schools have been successful notwithstanding their weak evidentiary 
basis, concluding that their success is attributable to the values they 
promote and the wide constituency to which these values appeal. 
Successes in educational civil rights have, likewise, been tied to larger 
movements based on values and justice. Losses, however, correspond 
with an inability to sustain these value-based movements. Thus, this 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1994) (detailing the events of Brown 
v. Board of Education). 
 31. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Green 
v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 434–35 (1968). 
 32. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 93, 95–96, 102, 120 (1995); Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 499 (1992). 
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Article concludes by urging civil rights advocates to refocus on framing 
their educational concerns in terms of justice and values that can sustain 
movements and to avoid reducing their claims to battles over evidence 
and good policy. 
I.  EDUCATION’S REOCCURRING CAUSAL GAP ACROSS TIME AND CLAIMS 
Professor Ronald Dworkin, as early as 1977, warned advocates 
against opening the Pandora’s Box of causation in school 
desegregation.33 To do so would lead courts down an analytical path 
from which desegregation could not escape victorious.34 What he could 
not predict, however, was that so few would take note in desegregation 
and in other subsequent educational civil rights movements. While his 
comments were not directed to the latter, the connections and analogies 
to the latter should have been clear. Ironically, very few, if any, scholars 
and advocates have even paused in all of the subsequent years to reflect 
on the centrality of causation in limiting educational civil rights 
movements. The result has been a gross oversight of a key weakness 
and, thus, a perpetual inclination to succumb to it.  
As the following Sections demonstrate, educational legal reform 
movements have largely been defined by the causation problems they 
confront. From school desegregation and school finance to the rights of 
English Language Learners and students with disabilities, causation 
issues have consistently constrained advocates’ ability to substantiate 
claims and secure remedies. The extent to which courts overlook or 
examine these issues has been the difference in plaintiffs’ success. 
When courts have relaxed or ignored causation inquiries, plaintiffs have 
had relatively little difficulty in establishing their claims. But in most 
instances where courts have seriously examined causal questions, they 
have found evidentiary gaps or demanded such precise evidence that 
plaintiffs have been unable to provide it. As a result, causal inquiries 
have served to limit liability under existing claims or eliminate classes 
of claims altogether. 
A.  School Desegregation 
The centrality of causation to the fall of educational claims is most 
obvious in school desegregation. In the earliest years of desegregation, 
causation was unquestioned and effectively irrelevant. Schools were 
emerging from a period in which they had entirely barred minorities 
from attending white schools. That those prohibitions were the cause of 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences 
of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. EDUC. 3, 12 (1977). 
 34. Id. 
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segregation in schools was beyond question.35 In addition, the Court’s 
initial failure to specify any remedy other than eliminating mandated 
segregation avoided tough causal questions.36 But once the Court 
demanded affirmative desegregation, the question of causation—at least 
theoretically—became important.  
As later described by the Court, the goal of Brown v. Board of 
Education37 was to restore victims of segregation to their former 
positions.38 Since courts cannot turn back the clock, restoring victims to 
their former position necessarily raises the question of the extent to 
which current segregation is attributable to past discrimination. Past 
discrimination and segregation could be the sole causes of all-black and 
all-white schools, but it is also possible that they only caused a 
disproportionately large or significant number of minorities to attend 
non-white schools. The Court’s earliest desegregation cases, however, 
avoided inquiries into these sorts of specific causal questions because 
they are effectively impossible to resolve, and any attempt to do so 
would have undermined the moral interests in eradicating legally 
sponsored discrimination.39 
As soon as desegregation moved outside the South, however, the 
Court immediately questioned the causal connection between 
segregation and discriminatory state action. Rather than assume a causal 
connection, the Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1 held that, in a 
district that was not previously segregated by law, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that intentional discrimination was the cause of current 
segregation.40 The requirement that plaintiffs identify a racial 
motivation to segregate students and connect it to actual segregative 
results represented a clear shift away from the previous paradigm to one 
that placed limits on schools’ duty to desegregate and left segregation 
that is not causally connected to past discrimination untouched.41  
The Court, however, was keenly aware that bringing these causal 
inquiries to the fore could end or prohibit desegregation just a few years 
after it had begun. As the end of de jure segregation became more 
distant in time, establishing liability would become increasingly 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487–88, 494 (1954). 
 36. Id. at 495–96 (reserving the question of a remedy for subsequent argument). 
 37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 38. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). 
 39. See generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 62 (1979) (“No single decision has had more moral 
force than Brown . . . .”); Paul Bender, Is the Burger Court Really Like the Warren Court?, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 635, 647 (1984) (describing segregation as a moral disaster).  
 40. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973). 
 41. Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State Constitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in 
Sheff v. O’Neill?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 351, 371 (1996) (describing the effect of the 
intent–causation standard as devastating to desegregation). 
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difficult. New acts of intentional discrimination would not be as blatant 
as old ones,42 nor would the causal connection between old policies and 
current circumstances be clear.43 The passage of time alone would 
guarantee changes in school board membership, school district 
administration, neighborhood compositions, and school enrollments,44 
any of which would complicate causal inferences. To mitigate the 
possibility of immediately undoing vast desegregation remedies, the 
Court held that, if a plaintiff could establish that intentional 
discrimination was the cause of a substantial portion of the segregation 
in a school district, it would presume that discrimination was the cause 
of all other segregation in the district.45 This presumption would also 
apply across time, with past discrimination presumptively causing 
current segregation.46 Thus, while the Court’s intent standard marked a 
clear limitation on desegregation in many districts, this presumption 
would potentially authorize even more expansive desegregation 
remedies in those districts that could overcome the initial threshold 
questions of intent and causation.  
Quickly realizing the possibility of the latter, the Court—shortly 
after adopting the causal presumption—began to curtail its application. 
Taken to its natural conclusion, there is very little racial inequality in 
schools to which the presumption would not apply.47 Thus, just one year 
later, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court made a crucial distinction 
between intra- and inter-district segregation, and refrained from 
applying the presumption to the latter.48 In the lower court, the plaintiffs 
had established intentional segregation by the Detroit school system, 
along with the collusion of the state and some surrounding districts.49 
The precise extent and cause of segregation in the entire metropolitan 
area were certainly vague, but applying the presumption to the 
established instances of segregation theoretically could have warranted 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 212–13 (describing how facially neutral assignment policies may 
in fact be discriminatory). 
 43. Id. at 211 (indicating that the connection between past discrimination and current 
segregation may be “so attenuated as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure 
segregation”). 
 44. See, e.g., Thomas Cnty. Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 
F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351 (2004). 
 45. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. 
 46. Id. at 210.  
 47. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: 
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 183, 195–201 (2003); see also Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 706 (N.D. Texas 
1981) (“Over time, disproof of causation might become increasingly difficult for the 
defendant . . . . It may become impossible ever to prove . . . that past school segregation no 
longer has an impact on residential segregation.”). 
 48. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974). 
 49. Id. 
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desegregation in the wider metropolitan area.50  
The Supreme Court, however, held that a metropolitan-wide remedy 
was unjustifiable in the absence of more substantial intentional 
discrimination by the suburban districts themselves.51 The Court made 
no mention of the presumption, notwithstanding the state’s 
discrimination, its control over the suburban districts, and some 
instances of discrimination by the suburban districts themselves. The 
Court dismissed the suburban discrimination as insignificant and the 
state involvement as too attenuated.52 In effect, the Court went from 
presuming a connection between current and past intra-district 
segregation in Keyes to presuming the opposite regarding the 
connection to inter-district segregation in Milliken.  
Three years later, the Court in Dayton Board of Education v. 
Brinkman53 went even further to limit the presumption’s effect in intra-
district cases. The Court required plaintiffs to demonstrate the 
“incremental segregative effect” of past discrimination on the current 
“racial distribution of [a] school population,” as measured by the 
difference between the current level of segregation and “what it would 
have been in the absence of constitutional violations.”54 Such a precise 
causal showing had never even been hinted at previously, but in Dayton 
it marked the outer limits of the desegregation remedy. The Court 
indicated that the remedy should do no more than “redress that [precise] 
difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be 
a systemwide remedy.”55 By forcing the plaintiffs to make these 
affirmative causal showings and demanding that plaintiffs close a 
practically unresolvable causal gap, the Court implicitly rejected the 
presumption and consequently limited desegregation. Ironically, the 
Court noted the problem it was creating, writing that such an inquiry 
was “a good deal more difficult than is typically the case in a more 
orthodox lawsuit”56 and “not an easy one to resolve.”57  
Subsequent decisions distinguished Dayton’s facts and forestalled 
the rapid deceleration of desegregation that the incremental causal 
effects requirement would have wrought.58 But Dayton’s fundamental 
                                                                                                                     
 50. In fact, courts in both the Sixth and Fourth Circuits had upheld an interdistrict remedy. 
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 
593 (E.D. Mich. 1971). See generally Bradley v. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 92, 106 (E.D. Va. 
1972) (holding that a plan to integrate schools in adjacent counties would be enforced).  
 51. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745. 
 52. Id. at 748–49. 
 53. 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
 54. Id. at 420. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 414. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Dayton involved a peculiar set of facts. The district court referred to a “cumulative 
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concern regarding the diminishing causal connection between the 
original acts of discrimination and current segregation resurfaced later 
to usher in the effective end of desegregation in most districts.59 In 
Freeman v. Pitts, the Court held that, “in the late phases of carrying out 
a decree, when [racial] imbalance is attributable neither to the prior de 
jure system nor to a later violation by the school district but rather to 
independent demographic forces,” lower courts are prohibited from 
requiring various aggressive desegregation measures.60 In earlier 
periods, the Court had assumed the connection to past discrimination 
because both the attribution and nonattribution of current imbalances 
were unclear.61 But the Court’s opinion in Freeman represented both a 
refusal to make any such causal assumptions and a shift toward 
delineating between the causes of segregation. Moreover, when 
significant demographic shifts have occurred, the Court will—to 
plaintiffs’ detriment—essentially presume that current segregation is the 
result of demographic shifts, rather than discrimination.62  
The Court’s rationale for its holding makes its skepticism regarding 
the causal connection between past and present segregation even 
clearer. The Court reasoned that although past segregation by the state 
was a “stubborn fact[] of history [that can] . . . linger and persist,” it 
must not “overstate its consequences in fixing legal responsibilities.”63 
For these vestiges of segregation to be any “concern of the law . . . , 
they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation 
being remedied.”64 In most instances, the Court indicated that such a 
connection no longer exists.65 Rather,  
[a]s the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and 
these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less 
likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a 
vestige of the prior de jure system. The causal link between 
current conditions and the prior violation is even more 
                                                                                                                     
violation” rather than a specific violation. Id. at 413. The facts also indicated that no intentional 
discrimination affected school attendance boundaries, but the district court faulted the school 
district for failing to take affirmative steps to desegregate. Id. at 412. 
 59. See id. at 417. 
 60. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 493 (1992) (emphasis omitted). 
 61. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207 (1973).  
 62. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495; see also David Crump, From Freeman to Brown and Back 
Again: Principle, Pragmatism, and Proximate Cause in the School Desegregation Cases, 68 
WASH. L. REV. 753, 794 (1993) (“Freeman allows the school district to rebut causation by 
showing that the violation was distant in time.”). 
 63. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495–96. 
 64. Id. at 496 (emphasis omitted). 
 65. Id. (“It is simply not always the case that demographic forces causing population 
change bear any real and substantial relation to a de jure violation. And the law need not 
proceed on that premise.”) (emphasis omitted). 
13
Black: Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to be Learned
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1736 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good 
faith.66  
The problem with this reasoning is that the causal effects of past 
discrimination have always been “subtle and intangible.”67 For this very 
reason, the Court in Keyes refused to place the full burden of 
establishing causation on the plaintiffs. And, given the passage of time, 
plaintiffs needed the benefit of the presumption more in Freeman than 
in Keyes. But rather than extend the presumption, the Court in Freeman, 
at best, acted as though the presumption evaporates over time and, at 
worst, reversed it, effectively presuming that demographic shifts sever 
the connection between present and past segregation.68 Given the 
inevitable demographic shifts in major metropolitan school districts and 
the unresolvable causal inquiry the shifts raise, very few plaintiffs have 
been able to meet the evidentiary requirements of Milliken and 
Freeman.69 Thus, a mere shift in the Court’s approach to causal gaps 
has been enough to bring an end to desegregation in most districts.  
One last option remained for plaintiffs: seeking additional resources 
to improve predominantly minority schools and districts where 
integration was not required under Supreme Court doctrine. Yet, shortly 
after Freeman, the Court’s opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins70 
demonstrated that the causal problems involved in justifying 
educational quality improvements are just as complex as those in school 
integration remedies. The district court in Jenkins had ordered 
qualitative improvements to remedy diminished African-American 
achievement.71 The primary basis for ordering qualitative educational 
improvements was that segregation deprived minority students not 
simply of the right to attend a school of their choice, but to receive a 
quality education,72 which had the effect of depressing African-
American achievement. This rationale had sufficed to justify qualitative 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 67. Id. 
 68. See generally Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of 
Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 559 (1999) (“[T]he causation presumptions appear to 
lessen in validity over time”); Crump, supra note 62, at 786.  
 69. See generally GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING 
RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES (2007) (listing major 
metropolitan districts where desegregation decrees were dissolved after the Court’s decisions in 
Dowell and Freeman). 
 70. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 71. Id. at 73. The Court interpreted these improvements as an attempt to attract whites 
back to the district, which it flatly rejected as inconsistent with Milliken v. Bradley. Id. at 91–93.  
 72. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 286–87 (1977) (upholding remedial education where actual school desegregation was 
not an option). 
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improvement remedies since the 1970s.73  
The Court in Jenkins, however, held that qualitative remedies are 
only justified when plaintiffs affirmatively demonstrate the causal 
connection between segregation and the achievement gap. In particular, 
plaintiffs must identify “the incremental effect that segregation has had 
on minority student achievement or the specific goals of the quality 
education programs.”74 And the Court presupposed that this effect 
would be limited at best, writing that “[j]ust as demographic changes 
independent of de jure segregation will affect the racial composition of 
student assignments, . . . so too will numerous external factors beyond 
the control of the [schools] affect minority student achievement.”75 
Thus, establishing the causal connection between past segregation and 
current achievement gaps would be no easier than connecting past 
segregation to current segregation. The Court, as in all of its cases after 
Keyes, raised a complex causal question and placed the nearly 
impossible burden of resolving it on plaintiffs.76  
The chart below of the Department of Justice’s desegregation docket 
offers a broad picture of the real-world effects of these causal 
requirements. In the early 1960s, the federal government’s involvement 
in desegregation was almost nonexistent. After the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Court’s decision in Green, desegregation rapidly grew into 
the 1970s, but the Court’s opinions in Milliken and Bradley imposed 
limits on this growth that the DOJ would quickly reach in the 1980s. 
The Court’s decisions in the 1990s offered the exit strategy from 
desegregation that has resulted in its decline ever since. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 73. In re Little Rock Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 1296, 1309 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 74. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101. 
 75. Id. at 102 (emphasis omitted). 
 76. James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern 
Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1673 (2003) (indicating that sorting the effects of 
past segregation from the effects of various external factors on student achievement is nearly 
impossible). 
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In sum, in the later stages of desegregation, the Court grew 
increasingly skeptical of the causal connection between past 
discrimination and either current segregation and the achievement gap. 
As a result, it implicitly rejected the Keyes presumption of causation 
and forced plaintiffs to make precise causal showings that, as a practical 
matter, have proven virtually impossible to establish. The nearly 
uniform failure of subsequent plaintiffs to meet these showings simply 
reaffirms this evidentiary quandary.77 Various lower court decisions 
demonstrate that causal inquiries into segregation and the achievement 
gap necessarily involve ambiguities that most often can only be 
resolved through inferences or presumptions, not with precise evidence 
or certainty.78 Plaintiffs can establish faulty conduct on the part of 
schools, such as intentional discrimination or segregation, but 
quantifying the effects of these acts presents a much higher hurdle. 
Thus, the retreat from presumption regarding causation ultimately 
marked the end of mandatory desegregation and allowed resegregation 
to take its place.79 
B.  English Language Learners 
The evidentiary gaps involved in causal inquiries, while common 
and most obvious in desegregation cases, similarly arise in other major 
areas of education law, dictating success and failure for English 
Language Learners, disabled students, and low income students and 
districts. The evidentiary gaps in these categories of education law have 
tended to coalesce around the causal connection between educational 
practices and student outcomes. In comparison to Missouri v. Jenkins—
where the causal connection was to be made across time—these areas of 
education law are theoretically in a better position to resolve the causal 
                                                                                                                     
 77. For instance, while almost every metropolitan school district in the country has 
experienced significant interdistrict segregation, only two courts have ever found that a 
plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to establish interdistrict segregation and the specific causation 
requirement. United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Indianapolis, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th 
Cir. 1980). Likewise, the basic existence of any significant demographic shifts has presented an 
insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs in sustaining desegregative school assignments. See, e.g., 
NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 971 (11th Cir. 2001); Lockett 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 839, 843 (11th Cir. 1997). On remand in 
Missouri v. Jenkins, the district court and Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs presented 
sufficient evidence to connect the achievement gap to past segregation. Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 
F.3d 588, 598–99 (8th Cir. 1997). Yet the courts sustained this conclusion largely by use of the 
Keyes presumption, rather than the impossible evidence the Supreme Court had seemed to 
demand. Id. at 593, 598. Moreover, other courts have refused to apply the presumption to the 
achievement gap. Coal. to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of Del., 90 F.3d 752, 776–77 
(3d Cir.1996); United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp. 214, 222 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 78. See supra note 77.  
 79. See generally GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR 
PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? 2, 8 (2004).  
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connection between particular educational policies or programs and 
student outcomes. Yet advocates have still struggled to make this 
connection in these areas and, thus, the movements have been 
significantly limited. 
The educational rights of English Language Learners (ELL) provide 
the first example. ELL rights revolve almost entirely around the courts’ 
application of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA), which 
obligates school districts “to take appropriate action to overcome 
language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its 
instructional programs.”80 While the statutory language clearly 
establishes an affirmative duty to assist ELL students, exactly what 
schools must do is unclear.81 Once a district takes some action, issues of 
causation immediately arise. Plaintiffs must establish that a district’s 
current program is causing diminished achievement or failing to elevate 
students’ achievement to the appropriate level. This showing is nearly 
impossible as a practical matter. 
The causal question is embedded in the basic three-prong test for 
evaluating ELL programs articulated in Castaneda v. Pickard.82 The 
first two prongs address whether a district’s ELL program is based on 
an educational theory and whether the district has actually implemented 
that theory.83 A district, however, need not establish academic 
consensus in regard to the educational theory, only some academic 
support.84 As a result, these first two prongs can be relatively cursory.85 
The third prong tests whether the ELL program is, in fact, effective in 
helping students overcome language barriers.86 This third inquiry 
directly implicates the causal connection between the ELL program and 
student outcomes.  
As in desegregation, the party that bears the burden of proof on this 
causal connection will most likely lose because too many variables and 
too much uncertainty are involved. Currently, that burden falls on 
                                                                                                                     
 80. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 81. Memorandum, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Policy Update on Schools’ Obligations Toward 
National Origin Minority Students With Limited-English Proficiency (Sept. 27, 1991), available 
at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/lau1991.html (indicating that a language 
program should be implemented, but “most court decisions in this area stop short of providing 
OCR [the Office of Civil Rights] and recipient institutions with specific guidance”). 
 82. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).  
 83. Id. at 1009–10. 
 84. Id. at 1009. 
 85. Eric Haas, The Equal Educational Opportunity Act 30 Years Later: Time to Revisit 
“Appropriate Action” for Assisting English Language Learners, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 361, 362, 387 
(2005); see, e.g., Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 307 
F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 86. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010. 
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plaintiffs in ELL cases.87 If ELL students have regressed or made no 
progress after being exposed to the district’s program, their ability to 
state a claim might be relatively easy. But if students have made some 
progress—which is almost inevitable, regardless of the district’s 
action—plaintiffs will struggle to establish that the progress they made 
was in spite of the ELL program and, thus, legally insufficient.88  
The problem is intertwined with districts’ extensive discretion under 
Castaneda in selecting an ELL program. That discretion makes 
identifying a baseline group against which to measure the students’ 
achievement an elusive objective.89 The fact that students might be 
performing significantly better in other programs that take a different 
pedagogical approach is of limited, if any, relevance because, under 
Castaneda, the district is free to adopt any program that has theoretical 
support.90 And comparing the challenged district to others with the 
same program can be circular. If the program chosen by the district is 
simply pedagogically inferior as a general matter, then comparing it to 
other pedagogically inferior districts is largely pointless. Performing at 
or above the level of these equally inferior programs does not mean that 
the challenged program is effective. Only the worst of the worst would 
actually reveal themselves as ineffective under this analysis. In short, 
because Castaneda does not qualitatively evaluate programs as a class 
in any meaningful way, plaintiffs in ineffective programs are forced to 
compare their achievement to students in other ineffective programs. 
Doing so ignores what may be the real causal factor in their low 
achievement—the program itself—and instead focuses on the 
possibility that the challenged district is ineffective in carrying out the 
program. 
The experience of advocates reveals that this problem is not just 
theoretical. Plaintiffs have almost uniformly been unable to overcome 
the causal problems posed by the Castaneda standard.91 So long as a 
district takes some action for which there is some pedagogical support, 
a plaintiff’s claim is likely to fail.92 Furthermore, because plaintiffs 
cannot easily resolve the causal burdens they bear, districts are largely 
free to adopt any ELL program they want with no qualitative check 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 1000. 
 88. See, e.g., Quiroz v. State Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. S-97-1600WBS/GGH, 1997 WL 
661163, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (“Castaneda provides no guidance in determining what 
standards a court should use in evaluating an educational plan. Because it ‘is surely beyond the 
competence of this court to fashion its own measure of academic achievement’ the court 
approaches this prong with ‘great trepidation.’”) (quoting Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. 
Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). 
 89. See id. 
 90. 648 F.2d at 1009–10. 
 91. See, e.g., Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 715–16. 
 92. Haas, supra note 85, at 387. 
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through litigation.93 In this respect, the Castaneda standard can render 
ELL services a right without a remedy. 
The longstanding litigation over Arizona’s ELL programs served as 
a meaningful exception for some time.94 The litigation had avoided 
causal pitfalls by focusing on state-level support of district-level policy, 
rather than local policy itself.95 The plaintiffs argued that the state was 
acting arbitrarily toward districts that were attempting to implement 
their obligations pursuant to the EEOA and Castaneda.96 Accepting this 
theory, the district court had ordered the state to provide remedies for 
nearly a decade.97  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Horne v. Flores,98 however, 
revealed that, even at the state level, causal questions remain dominant. 
The Court rejected the district court’s finding that the persistent 
achievement gap between ELL students and native speakers was 
attributable to inadequate funding or the low quality of ELL educational 
programs.99 The Court indicated that the causal inquiry was far more 
complex than the district court recognized. Thus, on remand, the Court 
instructed the district court to focus on two distinct causal questions. 
First, it directed the lower court to closely examine variables unrelated 
to the ELL program itself that might explain the achievement gap, such 
as “the difficulty of teaching English to older students (many of whom, 
presumably, were not in English-speaking schools as younger students) 
and problems such as drug use and the prevalence of gangs.”100 The 
Court’s obvious assumption was that the achievement gap was 
attributable to student and family factors rather than schools. Second, 
the Court questioned whether funding—much less incremental increases 
in it—bears any relationship to the quality of an ELL program.101 The 
Court indicated that the plaintiffs must establish that money has a causal 
effect on educational quality, that educational quality has an effect on 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Flores v. Arizona, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1167 (D. Ariz. 2007); Flores v. 
Arizona, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1113 (D. Ariz. 2005); Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 
1225–27 (D. Ariz. 2000). 
95.  Flores, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
96.  Id. at 1239. 
 97. The court first ordered a remedy in 2000. Id. at 1240. 
 98. See Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2605 (2009) (holding that to determine whether 
a school district violated the EEOC, the court must consider not only the funding level of the 
ELL program and the achievement of the students in the program, but also changed 
circumstances related to the ELL population and any other means aside from increased funding 
that the State was employing to improve ELL instruction and student performance). 
 99. Id. at 2588–89. 
 100. Id. at 2605 n.20. 
 101. Id. at 2603; see also Eric A. Hanushek, The Failure of Input-Based Schooling 
Policies, 113 ECON. J. F64, F69–F70 (2003) (reviewing U.S. data regarding funding and school 
performance). 
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achievement, and that the achievement gap between ELL and other 
students is not caused by outside factors.102  
In sum, ELL students, without question, have the right to 
educational services that assist them in overcoming language barriers. 
By placing districts on notice of their affirmative obligation to take 
some action, ELL students have seen an expansion of programs beyond 
what existed prior to the EEOA. But ELL claims involve causal gaps 
that make enforcing the qualitative aspects of this right nearly 
impossible. The Castaneda standard affords districts so much discretion 
that plaintiffs are unable to establish that a district’s program—even a 
poor one—is the cause of educational failure. Similarly, even a state’s 
refusal to significantly support ELL programs will go unchecked unless 
a plaintiff can somehow control for numerous variables and causally 
connect state policy to student outcomes. As a result, the initial promise 
of affirmative rights has been stymied by causal uncertainty.  
C.  Poverty and School Finance Litigation 
1.  Causation as a Limit on Past Reform 
School finance litigation has faced the same problem of attributing 
student outcomes to school inputs as other reform movements, but at a 
much higher level. The question has not been whether a particular 
program in a particular school or classroom affects the outcomes for 
particular students, but whether a statewide system of school financing 
affects school quality and student outcomes. As Professor Michael 
Rebell writes, in almost every state school finance case, “the question of 
whether ‘money matters’ has been a central legal issue [that 
precipitated] extensive expert testimony on . . . technical economic and 
social science issues.”103 Notwithstanding school finance litigation’s 
relative success in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, both its 
initial and continuing limitations have been a function of an uncertain 
causal connection. 
Early on, this causal gap forestalled school finance equality 
altogether and, in fact, contributed to the effective end of federal 
litigation. Plaintiffs initially pursued school finance reform under the 
theory that the Federal Equal Protection Clause prohibits certain 
inequalities.104 In San Antonio Independent School District v. 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2600–06 (reviewing factors that must be considered on remand 
before a judgment can be made as to whether the school district was taking “appropriate 
action”).  
 103. Rebell, supra note 25, at 1484. 
 104. Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 493, 497 (1995). 
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Rodriguez,105 the Supreme Court rejected the claim on numerous 
grounds, but its concern regarding the causal connection between 
money and educational quality was clear. Even if students had a 
fundamental interest in education, the Court indicated that a causal flaw 
pervaded plaintiffs’ claim. The Court wrote: “On even the most basic 
questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are divided. 
Indeed, one of the major sources of controversy concerns the extent to 
which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational 
expenditures and the quality of education.”106 The Court further 
indicated that the lower court had incorrectly “assumed [a] correlation 
[in] . . . virtually every legal conclusion” it drew regarding money.107 
This rejection of school finance litigation on both legal and factual 
grounds effectively ended the movement in federal courts. 
Plaintiffs responded by pressing claims in state courts under state 
constitutions.108 State constitutions offered a different legal paradigm, 
but the uncertainty of the causal connection between money and 
educational outcomes remained. The way each respective state court has 
dealt with the causal uncertainty has largely dictated the outcome of 
finance reform in the state. As a general matter, state courts have 
addressed the problem in one of three ways: (1) rejecting claims based 
on the lack of a clear causal connection;109 (2) acknowledging the lack 
of consensus on the causal question, but determining that the weight of 
the overall social science or the evidence in a particular state is 
sufficient to establish a causal connection;110 or (3) simplifying the 
inquiry by ignoring whether money correlates with particular outcomes 
and, instead, inferring a causal connection to those outcomes based on 
the fact that money buys access to certain tangible resources.111  
The Colorado Supreme Court exemplifies the first category, which 
rejects plaintiffs’ claims based on insufficient evidence of a causal 
connection between money and educational outcomes. In Lujan v. 
Colorado State Board of Education,112 the court refused to seriously 
entertain the plaintiffs’ claims, simply asserting that “a raging 
controversy” persists over whether “there is a direct correlation between 
school financing and educational quality and opportunity.”113 Absent 
evidence “that equal educational opportunity requires equal 
                                                                                                                     
 105. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 106. Id. at 42–43. 
 107. Id. at 43. 
 108. Underwood, supra note 104, at 498. 
 109. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982).  
 110. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 406 (N.J. 1990). 
 111. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976). 
 112. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). 
 113. Id. at 1018. 
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expenditures for each school child,” judicial intervention in school 
finance would amount to “social policy under the guise that there is a 
fundamental right to education.”114 Other courts have gone deeper into 
the factual and causal issues, but still come to the same conclusion 
regarding the causal connection. For instance, the Georgia Supreme 
Court found that the state’s funding scheme created unequal access to 
certain resources, but refused to conclude that this inequality had a 
causal effect on the quality of education in particular districts or 
negatively impacted student outcomes.115  
A significant number of courts fall into the second category, which 
finds a causal connection between money and outcomes.116 Courts in 
this group, however, differ in the quality of evidence upon which they 
base this conclusion. Several courts have concluded that money is 
causally connected to school quality or student outcomes based on 
social science and statistical evidence,117 while others are content to 
reach the same conclusion in the absence of any hard evidence. In fact, 
some courts suggest that such a causal connection should not matter. 
Courts taking this approach blur the line between courts that find an 
evidentiary causal connection and courts that infer a causal connection 
based on the simple notion that money buys resources.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for instance, clearly falls into the 
category of concluding that money matters,118 but expresses serious 
ambivalence regarding the evidentiary basis for a causal connection. In 
Abbott v. Burke,119 the court admitted that “controversy abounds” and 
that the “research, while promising and constructive, [is] inconclusive, 
at least on the underlying issue before us” regarding whether money 
improves educational outcomes.120 The research, the court wrote, is 
clear “that money alone has not worked,” and that some strategies have 
shown promise even without money.121 The court, however, 
distinguished itself from courts in the first category—those that reject 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Id. 
 115. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160–61 (Ga. 1981). 
 116. Rebell, supra note 25, at 1484–85 (finding that twenty-nine out of the thirty courts 
that examined the question have “determined that money does indeed matter”). 
117. See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 389 (Vt. 1997); Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-
1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *49–50 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003). 
 118. In fact, this court has the most ardent commitment to this principle in the country. Its 
first decision was Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 276–77 (1973). The New Jersey Supreme 
Court issued its twentieth decision in this line of cases in 2009 in Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 
991–92 (N.J. 2009). For a discussion of the various remedies ordered by the court, see Paul L. 
Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational Rights Under the New Jersey 
Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 917, 926–28 (1998). 
 119. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
 120. Id. at 404. 
 121. Id. 
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plaintiffs’ claims—by refusing to surrender to the lack of causal 
certainty and indicating that, while research may not have uniformly 
shown a positive causal connection, “it does not show that money 
makes no difference.”122 This conclusion, combined with the fact that 
students have an affirmative right to education in that state, prompted 
the New Jersey court to resort to what amounted to a presumption in 
favor of the plaintiffs’ causal claim. “[W]hile we are unable to conclude 
from this record that the State is clearly wrong,” the court wrote, 
denying plaintiffs relief would “strip all notions of equal and adequate 
funding from the constitutional obligation unless we were convinced 
that the State was clearly right.”123 That the court was willing to err on 
the plaintiffs’ side in regard to this causal question was clear when it 
wrote:  
[E]ven if not a cure, money will help, and [ ] these students 
are constitutionally entitled to that help. 
If the claim is that additional funding will not enable 
the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and 
efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are 
entitled to pass or fail with at least the same amount of 
money as their competitors.124  
In short, that plaintiffs have succeeded in cases where the evidence 
regarding the causal connection is front and center does not mean the 
issue has been resolved.  The causal problem is always lurking, and is 
largely kept at bay not by the evidence, but by the way in which courts 
approach it.  
The last category of courts stands alone in avoiding the causal 
problem, but has done so only by ignoring it altogether or framing a 
much simpler inquiry. For instance, the California Supreme Court in 
Serrano v. Priest125 upheld a challenge to the state’s school finance 
scheme,126 but relegated the causal issue to a single footnote, indicating 
that the differing scholarly findings were irrelevant.127 Rather than 
substantively address the issue, the court simply took the plaintiffs’ 
allegations that money affected quality as true, and noted “that the 
several courts which have considered contentions [to the contrary] have 
uniformly rejected them.”128 But the Serrano court’s citations regarding 
other courts’ conclusions are unpersuasive. The other courts’ rejections 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 403. 
 125. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
 126. Id. at 1244. 
 127. Id. at 1253 n.16. 
 128. Id. 
23
Black: Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to be Learned
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1746 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
of the argument that money does not matter were not necessarily based 
on evidence. In fact, at least two of those courts based their conclusions 
on intuitive inferences or assumptions, concluding, for instance, that 
money affected quality because “[p]resumably, students receiving a 
$1000 education are better educated tha[n] those acquiring a $600 
schooling.”129  
In a second appeal in the Serrano litigation,130 the court devoted 
slightly more analysis to the causal connection, but still ignored the 
possibility that there was an evidentiary gap. This time the court gave 
no hint of the debate, asserting in conclusory fashion that a causal 
connection existed. Without explanation or citation to authority, it wrote 
that “[s]ubstantial disparities in expenditures per pupil among school 
districts cause and perpetuate substantial disparities in the quality and 
extent of availability of educational opportunities.”131 Similarly, it flatly 
asserted that “differences in dollars do produce differences in pupil 
achievement.”132 Ultimately, the court’s only basis for finding a 
connection was to infer a connection based on the undeniable fact that 
the current financing system afforded wealthier districts an advantage in 
obtaining quality teachers, staff, equipment, and facilities.133 Of course, 
the evidentiary question that courts in the other categories struggle with 
is not this simple one, but rather whether these differences amount to 
meaningful differences in educational quality and achievement. 
Unsurprisingly, those courts falling into the first category uniformly 
reject school finance claims, and those falling into the second and third 
categories tend to uphold school finance challenges. Yet virtually no 
court is immune to ambivalence regarding the causal connection. At 
best, those in the third category hide their ambivalence by refusing to 
discuss the evidence. In short, a significant causal gap pervades all 
school finance cases, and the differing outcomes in the cases are not a 
product of differing evidence, but of courts’ willingness to tolerate 
uncertainty regarding the evidence. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 129. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff’d sub nom. McInnis v. 
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); see also Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 477, 479 (1971); 
Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (“[I]t may be that in the abstract ‘the 
difference in dollars available does not necessarily produce a difference in the quality of 
education.’ But this abstract statement must give way to proof [that spending differentials result 
in] actual educational advantages in the high-cost schools, especially with respect to the caliber 
of the teaching staff.”). 
 130. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
 131. Id. at 939. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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2.  Causation as the Means to End Current School Finance 
Even in those several states where school finance litigation has been 
successful and causal uncertainties purportedly resolved, the end or 
severe limitation of the movement remains a serious risk. The 2008 
financial crisis placed immense pressure on state and local budgets. 
Some localities were nearly insolvent, and the rest faced “the biggest 
cutbacks they’ve seen in decades.”134 Only the influx of $53.6 billion in 
federal stimulus and emergency aid avoided educational catastrophe 
during the last two years.135 With no more aid readily forthcoming, 
school districts have been fully confronting the harsh reality of falling 
state revenues that required staggering budget cuts.136 Thirty-four states 
and the District Columbia have already made enormous cuts to public 
schools, some approaching one billion dollars.137 Cuts of this sort have 
prompted claims that some states are failing to meet their state 
constitutional obligations in regard to education.138  
These outside pressures are of the very sort that can force a 
reexamination of the underlying causal question in school finance. 
Courts that do not want to find themselves compromised by the 
collision of legal rights and practical reality can extricate themselves by 
demanding precise evidence of the causal connection at the center of 
plaintiffs’ claims. While many of these courts have previously found a 
causal connection, they based their findings on simplistic reasoning or 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Anne Marie Chaker, K-12 Schools Slashing Costs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2008, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122895665184096557.html. 
 135. Education Jobs Fund, Pub. L. No. 111–226 (2010) (allocating ten billion dollars 
during 2010–11 to save education jobs); U.S. Dept. Educ., State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/stabilization-fund.html (last visited Aug. 
24, 2012) (detailing the need for and disbursement of education funds as part of the larger 
economic stimulus bill of 2009). 
 136. Associated Press, Record Number of Calif. Districts Struggling to Pay Bills, EDUC. 
WEEK, June 30, 2010; Tamar Lewin & Sam Dillon, Districts Warn of Deeper Teacher Cuts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010; Eric A. Hanushek, Cry Wolf! This Budget Crunch Is for Real, EDUC. 
WEEK, May 19, 2010; Leslie A. Maxwell, K-12 Cuts Loom Again as States’ Fiscal Woes 
Continue, With Budget Gaps Growing, About Half Expect K-12 Cuts, ED WEEK (March 30, 
2010). 
 137. Jane Stancill, Teachers Protest N.C. Budget Cuts, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 4, 2011); 
Nicholas Johnson et al., An Update on State Budget Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1214. 
 138. David Harrison, New Budget Cuts Threaten School Funding Settlements, STATELINE 
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.seniorwomen.com/news/index.php/stateline-new-budget-cuts-threate 
n-school-funding-settlements (discussing the problems that diminished educational funds create 
for complying with a past state finance settlement); Anthony Ramirez, Further Education Cuts 
Spur Fear of Lawsuits, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 23, 2010 (discussing the potential for a lawsuit in 
Nevada as a result of education cuts); Michael A. Rebell, Litigation Strategies for Hard 
Economic Times (December 17, 2010), http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/12-2010S 
tateline.php3. 
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general principles derived from social science, not necessarily specific 
state-level causal evidence. Moreover, plaintiffs may be in an even 
worse position today than before because courts and advocates have in 
increasing numbers relied on standardized test scores in making out 
their claims.139 Where standardized test scores were used to prove a 
violation, it is only a matter of time before courts examine the effect of 
past remedies on these scores.140 Yet, given the intractable causal gaps 
seen elsewhere, plaintiffs may find themselves unable to defend against 
this attack.  
In effect, educational advocates have leveraged test score failures 
into education finance litigation success.141 Without question, student 
achievement on standardized tests is relevant to educational adequacy. 
But that test scores are relevant does not mean that they resolve the 
question of whether students are receiving an adequate education. 
NCLB’s apparent attempt to reduce educational quality to test scores, 
and states’ curricular and statutory movements in this direction, signal 
that this distinction is getting lost. If this occurs, plaintiffs will be at the 
mercy of the courts. As Professor James Ryan has argued, plaintiffs 
perceive this move as being to their benefit, but it can backfire. Rather 
than leading “a court to order increased funding, poor test scores might 
just trigger an inquiry into whether the disparities in test scores relate to 
insufficient funding. Plaintiffs will succeed in their quest for funding if, 
but only if, that causal link can be established.”142 Thus, the centrality 
of test scores simply opens up the core causal problems that have been 
unresolvable elsewhere. Plaintiffs will be unable to demonstrate that a 
precise amount of increased funding leads to a precise increase, if any, 
in test scores. This evidentiary gap, rather than any flaw in plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                     
 139. For instance, in the seminal 1989 adequacy case, Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), the Kentucky Supreme Court wrote that “achievement 
test scores in the poorer districts are lower than those in the richer districts and expert opinion 
clearly established that there is a correlation between those scores and the wealth of the district.” 
Id. at 197. Courts in other states have followed, explicitly indicating that test scores were an 
appropriate factor for assessing the constitutionality of their school systems. See Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 
(N.C. 1997); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (identifying 
assessments as an element of adequacy, but finding low test scores alone do not indicate 
inadequacy). Some courts have gone so far as to treat test scores as equivalent to a prima facie 
indicator. See Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 488–89 (Ark. 2002) (stating 
that test scores are a “serious problem”); Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, 
at *47 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (“Kansas test results are informative and disturbingly 
telling.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 752 (N.H. 2002). 
 140. See Ryan, supra note 76, at 1673. 
 141. Id. at 338; James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. 
L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2008); ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE O. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A 
POLICY PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2008). 
 142. Ryan, supra note 141, at 1243. 
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claim or merit of the state’s education system, can end or seriously 
constrain school finance reform in the courts.  
The recent financial crisis and the slow exit from it only make this 
scenario more likely. New claims will place the judiciary in an 
increasingly precarious situation. Most of the previous decisions 
recognizing education rights were issued during times of relative 
economic prosperity.143 Today, courts are faced with demanding that 
state legislatures devote a larger portion of an already shrunken overall 
state budget to education, demanding that they raise taxes, treating 
students’ constitutional right to education as contingent, or articulating 
less robust rights. Ordering financial remedies would test the 
institutional capacity of courts, while backing away from precedent 
might permanently undercut existing rights.144 Either option would 
shrink educational opportunity.  
These unenviable options will place pressure on the courts to find 
other ways out of the litigation. The rising importance of test scores in 
school finance litigation can provide an easy exit strategy. Educational 
advocates are in no better position than any other education reform 
movement to demonstrate a causal connection between money and 
educational outcomes as measured on standardized tests. In fact, given 
the extensive research devoted to this very question and its failure to 
produce conclusive and specific results, school finance litigation 
advocates could be in a worse position. The point here is not to criticize, 
but simply to diagnose and warn. School finance litigation’s most 
consistent success has come through its ability to assess adequacy and 
equality in terms of education inputs, with only tangential attention to 
causal effects on educational outcomes such as test scores. NCLB and 
the financial crisis create pressures to shift this balance. This shift could 
reverse school finance reform’s trajectory, just as it has elsewhere.145 
D.  Students with Disabilities 
To the extent that there is an exception to causation’s negative 
impact on education reform movements, it may be in special education. 
                                                                                                                     
 143. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 25, at 1499–1500 (recounting the success of school 
finance litigation during the 1990s and the following decade). 
 144. See, e.g., Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 844–45 (Ala. 2002). 
 145. Recent scholarship, however, offers one important caveat. Professors Charles Sabel 
and William Simon suggest that modern public litigation has moved beyond the model offered 
by Professor Abram Chayes in the 1970s. They conclude that public law litigation can 
destabilize public structures that work to plaintiffs’ disadvantage. The litigation helps plaintiffs 
gain a seat at the table of policy formation. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1018–21 
(2004). In this respect, school finance litigation might not present unreasonable challenges to the 
current system, but may simply force it to account for schools’ needs as it navigates through this 
crisis. 
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Certain categories of special education claims have avoided the causal 
problems that have plagued other education claims, but this exception is 
primarily a function of the fact that so many special education rights are 
procedural rather than substantive in nature.146 The Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) guarantees students access to a 
free and appropriate public education, which includes specialized 
educational services in many instances.147 This right is a substantive 
right. The majority of the Act, however, deals not with the substance of 
these educational services, but with the numerous and precise 
procedures that schools must follow in delivering these services.148 
While parents surely have substantive complaints about the quality of 
the educational services their children receive, school districts more 
often struggle to comply with the procedural aspects of the Act. In fact, 
some courts never reach the merits of the educational services 
themselves because the procedural violations are so egregious, or 
sufficient in and of themselves, that they warrant relief.149  
Procedural rights, as opposed to substantive rights, avoid causal 
problems for at least two reasons. First, procedural rights are 
unambiguously affirmative, whereas the rights implicated in 
desegregation, for instance, are negative.150 Students do not have a right 
to integrated schools, but only a right to be free from discrimination.151 
Establishing that a school has failed to deliver an affirmative right is 
simple in comparison to establishing the existence of discrimination. In 
effect, with affirmative rights, the absence of beneficial action by the 
school means the student wins.152 With negative rights, the burden is on 
                                                                                                                     
 146. See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How Exceptional 
Children in Out-of-Home Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 81, 
93 (2000) (“[C]ompliance with special education mandates is often focused on meeting 
procedural requirements as opposed to outcome goals.”). 
 147. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (guaranteeing a free appropriate education); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412 (2006) (requiring individualized education plans); 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006) (listing the 
special services on which funds may be spent). 
 148. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (detailing various procedural protections). 
 149. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 564 F. Supp. 166, 169 
(D.D.C.1983) (finding District of Columbia Public Schools obligated to fund private placement 
where it fails “to provide the necessary procedural safeguards in processing requests for special 
education”); M.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 437 F.3d 1085, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that the failure to comply with IDEA procedural protections justified relief). 
 150. See generally Meredith Lee Bryant, Combating School Resegregation Through 
Housing: A Need for a Reconceptualization of American Democracy and the Rights It Protects, 
13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 156–59 (1997) (discussing the negative rights 
conceptualization of school desegregation); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative 
Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 872, 885, 888 (1986). 
 151. See Bryant, supra note 150, at 166 (arguing that the Court betrayed its early 
commitments to desegregation and returned to a purely negative rights view). 
 152. See id. 
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the plaintiff, who must establish a wrongful act by the school, and the 
absence of any evidence means the school wins.153 Second, procedural 
rights avoid causal problems because the vindication of procedural 
violations does not rest upon evidence of educational harm per se, at 
least not in special education. The legal harm is the deprivation of the 
procedure itself, not the substantive educational right the procedure is 
designed to protect.154 Thus, causation is effectively irrelevant, as the 
harm and its causation are necessarily embodied in the failure to follow 
procedure.  
Yet, even with the benefit of various affirmative and procedural 
obligations,155 some students can still experience causal problems under 
IDEA. For instance, the pure question of whether a student actually has 
a disability implicates causal issues and precedes many procedural 
obligations. Most notably, a parent might believe that his child’s 
academic problems are caused by a disability, but a school, not inclined 
to provide the requisite services, might assert that the academic 
problems are caused by other factors.156 At this early stage, the school is 
in a far better position to win because of the inherent difficulty of the 
causal inquiry.157 Thus, it is not surprising that parents frequently 
encounter school district resistance at this stage as opposed to later.158 
 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See id.  
 154. See, e.g., M.M., 437 F.3d at 1097–98 (finding that the failure to comply with IDEA 
procedural protections would justify a monetary award for parents). Congress has attempted to 
curtail the procedural requirements of the Act, particularly those related to paperwork. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1408 (2006). 
155. Even the substantive aspects of IDEA have a procedural bent to them, whereby 
causation is irrelevant and harm is assumed. If a student can establish that a school did not offer 
the appropriate services, courts will award damages for the value of those services or 
compensatory services without inquiring as to the effect on the student. See, e.g., Forest Grove 
Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009). In effect, the student is harmed by the 
deprivation of the service itself, not by any differential educational outcome. Moreover, because 
the deprivation of the service is a violation, some courts permit students to attach emotional and 
other compensatory damages to the deprivation. See Mark C. Weber, Damages Liability in 
Special Education Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 83, 83–84 (2002). 
 156. See, e.g., Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. ex rel. Patricia F., 503 F.3d 378, 384 (5th 
Cir. 2007); N.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 473 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
 157. See P.J. v. Eagle-Union Cmty. Sch. Corp., 1999 WL 1054599, at *3 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(indicating that the student’s improved academic performance during the year and pediatrician’s 
finding that he was not learning-disabled were sufficient bases for the school to determine he 
was not in need of special education); Rodiriecus L. v. Waukegan Sch., 90 F.3d 249, 254 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (finding no basis for school to suspect disability when student’s academic 
performance was average and student’s guardian never requested special education services); 
Katherine May, By Reason Thereof: Causation and Eligibility Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 173, 185 (2009). 
 158. May, supra note 157, at 185. 
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Likewise, when individuals have asserted educational disability 
claims outside of federal law and its procedural protections, causal 
problems become even more obvious. For instance, when parents have 
brought educational malpractice claims involving disability 
classification or a student’s specific special education placement, the 
harm to the student comes to the forefront and presents causal problems. 
Even if a plaintiff can establish that a special education classification or 
placement itself was substantively incorrect—which is no small feat—
the plaintiff must still establish that this classification or placement 
caused educational harm to the student to sustain retroactive relief.159 
Just as in ELL cases, plaintiffs would need to demonstrate that the 
educational failure was attributable to the school’s actions, rather than 
some other factor. While the school’s actions may be a partial cause, a 
student’s academic achievement or failure—as in other education 
paradigms—rarely occurs in a vacuum, and can be affected by various 
other factors.160 Sorting these factors out in the absence of a reasonable 
baseline indicating what the child would have achieved in a different 
program or with a proper classification implicates the same causal 
problems and speculations as in other educational paradigms. 
In short, while many disability claims provide an exception to the 
causal problems that typically pervade education reform, this exception 
proves this Article’s overall theory. The exceptions in disability law are 
limited to claims involving procedural violations, which themselves are 
unique because they involve affirmative rights. In contrast, those 
disability claims that go to the substance of students’ rights tend to 
implicate the same causal inquiries that arise in any other movement 
and present significant barriers to students seeking relief.   
E.  No Child Left Behind Act 
The causal flaws of educational civil rights, moreover, are not 
simply a function of the litigation process. Although litigation tends to 
accentuate the problem, the primary flaw is resting educational reform 
entirely on a causal assertion, regardless of the forum. The No Child 
Left Behind Act provides an almost audacious example of these same 
problems in statutory and regulatory reform. The Act’s stated purpose 
was “to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska 
1981) (“The level of success which might have been achieved had the mistakes not been made 
will, we believe, be necessarily incapable of assessment, rendering legal cause an 
imponderable.”); Smith v. Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941 (Cal. 
3d Ct. App. 1979) (indicating precedent had rejected such claims because of “the difficulties of 
assessing the wrongs and injuries involved”). 
 160. See, e.g., May, supra note 157, at 182–85 (discussing the causal problems involved in 
determining whether a student’s academic problems are related to a disability). 
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opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, 
proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and 
state academic assessments.”161 More specifically, the Act was designed 
to close the achievement gap for poor and minority students and end 
what President George W. Bush termed the “soft bigotry of low 
expectations.”162 The Act would achieve this through an accountability 
system demanding that states set high academic standards for all 
students; test students yearly in core content areas; disaggregate test 
scores by race, poverty, and other factors; and sanction schools that 
failed to meet proficiency benchmarks.163 The ultimate requirement was 
that 95% of students, including 95% of students in individual sub-
groups, reach proficiency in every school by 2014.164  
The Act dug its own grave by requiring that these unquestionably 
high achievement goals be met within a definite time frame,165 and 
premising their attainment on a causal connection between standardized 
testing and improved student achievement. Unlike previous legislation, 
it sought to address educational failures not by creating entitlements to 
resources or even discretionarily driving funds toward particular 
educational inputs, but by expanding achievement assessment 
systems.166 The expansion of assessment was relatively easy to achieve, 
as was the assertion of high expectations, but fairly meeting those 
expectations has proven unrealistic. All states instituted the standards 
and tests, but absent blatant manipulation of the tests the proficiency 
level goals would not be met, nor would the less-emphasized stipulation 
that all students be taught by highly qualified teachers occur.167 More 
than 80% of schools were set to be labeled as failing in the fall of 
2012.168 The achievement gap between minority and white children or 
between poor and middle-income children has not significantly 
decreased, nor has any widespread increase in scores occurred.169 And 
                                                                                                                     
 161. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).  
 162. Sam Dillon, Democrats Make Bush School Act an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
23, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/us/politics/23child.html. 
 163. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
 164. The Act technically requires schools to move toward 100% proficiency, but only 
requires that 95% of students be tested. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(E)–(H) (2006). 
 165. Id.  
 166. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1) (2006). 
 167. See generally NAOMI CHUDOWSKY & VIC CHUDOWSKY, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, MANY 
STATES HAVE TAKEN A “BACKLOADED” APPROACH TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND GOAL OF ALL 
STUDENTS SCORING “PROFICIENT” (May 2008); SHELBY DIETZ AND MALINI ROY, CTR. ON EDUC. 
POL’Y, HOW MANY SCHOOLS HAVE NOT MADE ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS UNDER THE NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT? (August 2010). 
 168. Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/education/08educ.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxn
nlx=1346024945-bv7UdeFstkq3JHBLrprr8Q. 
 169. ANNA HABAS ROWAN ET AL., EDUC. TRUST, GAUGING THE GAPS: A DEEPER LOOK AT 
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in regard to high-quality teachers, the effect has been minimal at best in 
the neediest schools.170 
These results mark NCLB as an enormous failure in the public’s 
eyes, and stem from the master narrative surrounding its enactment that 
based its efficacy on an inherently problematic causal connection. In 
essence, NCLB was premised on the assertion that standardized testing 
and accountability would raise student achievement in general and close 
the achievement gap.171 No significant research supported that 
conclusion.172 At best, the experience of a few states that had 
implemented their own testing and accountability systems coincided 
with some educational gains.173 But the reforms in those states were not 
limited to testing and accountability; they were part of larger education 
reforms.174 Moreover, while these states experienced meaningful 
educational advances, they did not elevate all students to proficiency,175 
nor did the large achievement gaps between white and minority students 
vanish.176 In short, NCLB promised results that it had no basis for 
believing it could deliver.  
The Act’s causal assertion, more than its actual function and results, 
                                                                                                                     
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 2–3 (2010), http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/ 
files/NAEP%20Gap_0.pdf. But see NAOMI CHUDOWSKY ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, STATE 
TEST SCORE TRENDS THROUGH 2007-08, PART 1: IS THE EMPHASIS ON “PROFICIENCY” 
SHORTCHANGING HIGHER- AND LOWER-ACHIEVING STUDENTS 1 (2009).  
 170. Sarah Almy & Christian Theokas, EDUC. TRUST, Not Prepared for Class: High 
Poverty Schools Continue to Have Fewer In-Field Teachers 1, 2 (2010), http://www.ed 
trust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Not%20Prepared%20for%20Class.pdf; EDUC. 
COMM’N OF THE STATES, ECS REPORT TO THE NATION: STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NO 
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 69 (2004), http://www.ecs.org/html/Special/NCLB/ReportToTheNatio 
n/docs/Report_to_the_Nation.pdf (indicating that no states were on track to meet the teacher 
requirements). 
 171. Nicholas Lemann, Testing Limits: Can the President’s Education Crusade Survive 
Beltway Politics?, NEW YORKER (July 2, 2001) (indicating the intent to aim the bill at a narrow 
group of schools); Diana Jean Schemo, The New Administration: News Analysis; Schoolbook 
Balancing Act, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2001) (excerpted Presidential speech). 
 172. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON 
INCENTIVES AND TEST-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 4-5 (Michael Hout & 
Stuart W. Elliot eds., 2011); see also Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Volatility in School 
Test Scores: Implications for Test-Based Accountability Systems, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC. 
POL’Y, 2002, at 235, 248, 253, 267–68. 
 173. Kane & Staiger, supra note 172, at 268. 
 174. See, e.g., W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 563, 565–66 
(Tex. 2003) (recounting the history of education challenges in Texas); Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 730 (Tex. 1995) (discussing the state standards system as a 
response to and in the context of school finance reform). 
 175. David S. Broder, Long Road to Reform: Negotiators Forge Education Legislation, 
WASHINGTON POST A01 (Dec. 17, 2001) (indicating that even North Carolina and Texas would 
have been labeled failing under the initial version of the bill). 
 176. See ROWAN, supra note 169, at 2, 5; see also Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 559 
S.E.2d 365, 392 (N.C. 2004) (discussing the lower court’s findings regarding achievement). 
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was its undoing. Viewed as a measure that was intended to meet the 
achievement levels it articulated, the Act was not simply a failure, but 
seems almost ridiculous in retrospect.177 The bill’s success, however, 
need not have been tied to this causal assertion. In fact, those closest to 
the bill may not have actually believed the assertion or seen it as the 
primary purpose of the bill.178 The White House and congressional 
leaders appear to have incorporated the causal assertion in the bill’s 
master narrative simply to rally support for it, when their actual 
expectations were much lower.179 
The problem is that no one else seemed to appreciate this. The 
earliest versions of the bill incited the fear of governors, who doubted 
the credibility of the causal claim, and the spirited support of 
congressional leaders, who believed wholeheartedly in the claim.180 The 
White House fell somewhere in between. While publicly trumpeting the 
efficacy of testing and accountability, the White House quietly admitted 
that one hundred percent proficiency was not possible,181 and indicated 
that its goal was to establish standards high enough to identify the worst 
schools, but not so high that they condemned good schools as 
failures.182 The final version of the bill was a compromise that retained 
high proficiency goals and explicit accountability for meeting those 
goals, but included several safety valves that would allow states or the 
Department of Education to mask the lack of meaningful 
improvement.183 The assertion that testing and accountability would 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See See Matthew D. Knepper, Comment, Shooting for the Moon: The Innocence of the 
No Child Left Behind Act’s One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal and its Consequences, 53 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 899, 907-08 (2009). 
 178. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Leaving Education Reform Behind, WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 14, 
2002) (indicating that the real effect of the bill was to require regular testing, but as to defining 
and meeting proficiency the bill gave states broad flexibility); The President’s Big Test, 
FRONTLINE (March 28, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/schools/nochild/ 
lemann.html (interviewing Nicholas Lemann, who characterizes the bill as a step toward a 
nationalized curriculum, and distinguishes the bill’s details from its rhetoric); Lorraine Woellert, 
Why the Education Bill Is Likely to Fail, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 25, 2001) 
(indicating that the “heart of the bill” was really about driving reform in the long term); see also 
James E. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-
Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1731–32 (2003) (finding that the bill 
creates the conditions for change rather than change itself). 
 179. FRONTLINE, supra note 178. 
 180. See id.; Woellert, supra note 178 (criticizing the bill for not being tough enough); 
Diana Jean Schemo, Bush Seems to Ease His Stance on the Accountability of Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 10, 2001) (noting that the House version of the bill was far more strict). 
 181. Schemo, supra note 180; see Michael D. Barolsky, High Schools Are Not Highways: 
How Dole Frees States from the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 725, 730–31 (2008). 
 182. Schemo, supra note 180. 
 183. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(A) (2006) (setting proficiency goals of 100%), with 
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3), (c) (2006) (allowing states to develop their own assessments and 
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improve education and close the achievement gap, however, remained 
the dominant narrative,184 while the safety valves went largely 
unnoticed. The safety valves represent an uneasiness or disbelief in the 
Act’s causal assertion and further suggest that the master narrative was 
simply part of selling the bill to the public and prompting state 
compliance. Knowing the Act could not produce full proficiency, those 
closest to the Act likely harbored a much narrower and more subtle set 
of goals.185 Measured by these narrower, noncausal goals, the Act was 
arguably a smashing success, but a full discussion of those goals would 
warrant its own paper.186  
In the end, even the safety valves proved insufficient to save the 
Act. The Act was simply too closely tied with its flawed causal 
assertion, the failure of which could not escape the public’s eye. 
Meeting the Act’s requirements may simply have required too much test 
manipulation for it to be seen as anything other than that. Parents, 
schools, and states knew they could not realistically meet the Act’s 
requirements long before they had technically failed and, consequently, 
simply awaited the Act’s deadlines, betting that Congress or the 
Department of Education would admit the flaw. Ultimately, few 
recognized or openly admitted the flaw.  Only an eleventh hour 
statutory waiver by the Secretary of Education this past fall saved 80% 
of the nation’s school districts from demonstrating the failure of this 
causal assertion and the severe sanctions that would have been 
                                                                                                                     
proficiency levels). See also FRONTLINE, supra note 178; Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 
1724. 
 184. FRONTLINE, supra note 178. 
 185. Infra note 186 
 186. First, the Act required states to align their curriculum with their standardized 
assessments, and test students yearly. Prior to the Act, only nine states had aligned their 
curriculum and tests, and only fifteen tested students yearly. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, 
at 1731. Today, all fifty states are doing both. EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, supra note 170. 
This was the only requirement in the Act that states could not avoid and, thus, possibly the Act’s 
primary goal. A byproduct of this testing has been the development of a rudimentary national 
concept of an adequate education, as well as significant movement toward a nationalized 
curriculum. See Frequently Asked Questions, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.corestandards.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). Second, rather than actually close 
the achievement gap, the Act’s goal could have been merely to identify and draw attention to it, 
which it has done. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1715; Linda Darling-Hammond, 
Evaluating ‘No Child Left Behind,’ NATION (May 21, 2007); Daniel J. Losen, Challenging 
Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s Race Conscious 
Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2004). Third, a federal educational accountability 
structure now exists and states grudgingly comply. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 256–57, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2009); Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 
F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2010). On their face, these “successes” might appear modest, but these 
modest successes are consistent with more profound longterm reform. See Liebman & Sabel, 
supra note 178, at 1720, 1735.  
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triggered.187  
II.  EDUCATION’S INHERENT CAUSAL PROBLEMS 
The forgoing Sections identified the role of causal gaps in limiting 
education reform across paradigms. The crucial underlying question is 
whether these gaps are a result of poor litigation strategy and evidence-
gathering, or a natural byproduct of education. On one level, the 
problem arises because education claims are framed, by litigants or 
courts, in ways that are premised on precise causation, which requires 
unobtainable evidence. Yet the precise framing of the claims does not 
create the causal problem in the first instance; it only exacerbates it. The 
real problem is that education itself is not conducive to causal showings. 
The way that education is delivered, the way students learn, the various 
factors that affect that learning, and the basic way we measure learning 
frequently defy precise explanation. Because these aspects of education 
defy clear explanation, plaintiffs might demonstrate that a school or 
state has engaged in inequitable or prohibited conduct, but they are 
unable to demonstrate how they have been harmed. 
A.  General Ambiguity 
Education eludes causal clarity in various different respects. First, 
how students receive education, what students actually receive, and how 
one demonstrates or verifies what students have received are not fully 
understood. Surely teaching fosters learning and that learning is later 
demonstrated by students, but our understanding of learning is far from 
a science.188 At best, we know that certain things tend to work well or 
work poorly.189 Second, even when we know certain things tend to 
work, those things do not remain constant. Schools, administrators, 
teachers, and students can vary more than they coalesce.190 Thus, to 
speak of education, a school district, or even a school as “acting” or 
“learning” in a particular way is, on some level, to engage in fictional 
narrative. Policies, programs, and curriculums unify educational units, 
allowing causal tendencies to emerge at the macro level, but causal 
factors also operate at much lower levels that defy larger narratives and 
measurement.191 In short, when we analyze education, we are often 
                                                                                                                     
 187. 20 U.S.C § 6316(b)(7) (2006) (describing sanctions for schools that fail to make 
adequate yearly progress). 
 188. STACEY CHILDRESS, DENIS DOYLE & DAVID A. THOMAS, LEADING FOR EQUITY: THE 
PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS at VI (2009). 
 189. See generally Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and 
Governance: Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 657–58 (2009–10) (discussing 
our limited knowledge regarding education reform). 
 190. Id. at 690–91 (discussing the highly contextualized variability at the classroom level). 
 191. Id.; see also Glenn Israel et al., The Influence of Family and Community Social 
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working with imprecise generalizations.  
Third, education is continually evolving and changing. Education is 
a process rather than a finite and static resource that students receive.192 
As such, there are nearly an infinite number of potential points of 
causation,193 and no point of causation alone is necessarily sufficient to 
produce an identifiable effect or significant outcome.194 This creates an 
internal conflict in measuring educational effects.195 Educational effects 
tend to be reliably assessed only at the cumulative level.196 Yet at the 
cumulative level, attribution is more complex because many more 
variables come into play—not all of which are measurable—and the 
measureable variables are not necessarily constant.197 In addition, as the 
number of variables increases, so too does the possibility that the 
variables will cancel each other out, which can result in otherwise 
important variables manifesting minimal effects.198   
Fourth, and implicit in the foregoing, certain aspects of education 
are polycentric. Policy changes can have secondary effects that 
counteract the primary policy. For instance, testing students exclusively 
on core subjects like math and science often leads to more instruction in 
those areas, but less in others.199 The reduced instruction in other areas, 
such as physical education and art can result in less emotionally and 
                                                                                                                     
Capital on Educational Achievement, 66 RURAL SOC. 43, 45–48 (2001) (discussing the impact 
that community and familial factors play in school performance). 
 192. See, e.g., Robert Balfanz & Vaughn Byrnes, Closing the Mathematics Achievement 
Gap in High-Poverty Middle Schools: Enablers and Constraints, 11 J. EDUC. STUDENTS PLACED 
AT RISK 143, 150–51 (2006) (discussing the varying gains that students make in math across 
years and the inability to identify any consistent trend and explanatory factor). 
 193. See generally Terri A. DeMitchell & Todd A. DeMitchell, A Crack in the Educational 
Malpractice Wall, AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, available at http://www.aasa.org/School 
AdministratorArticle.aspx?id=6516 (discussing a number of causative factors including 
physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, and environmental factors, as well as student 
attitude, motivation, temperament, past experiences, and home environment); James Traub, No 
Child Left Behind; Does It Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/10/education/no-child-left-behind-does-it-work.html?pagewa 
nted=all&src=pm (referring to an essay by E.D. Hirsch Jr., which argued that “so many 
variables go into learning” that virtually no study can draw firm conclusions regarding reform). 
 194. Balfanz & Byrnes, supra note 192, at 151; Traub, supra note 193 (stating that 
subjectivity makes it impossible to result in an objective answer as to how to better educate); see 
also Thomas Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Improving School Accountability Measures 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8156, 2001) (proposing more sophisticated 
statistical analysis for education outcomes that would account for the infinite number of 
variables that potentially influence academic performance). 
 195. Kane & Staiger, supra note 194, at 1–4.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.; see also Balfanz & Byrnes, supra note 192, at 151. 
 198. Kane & Staiger, supra note 194, at 1–4. 
 199. George R. Weiher & Kent L. Tedin, Minority Student Achievement, 23 REV. POL’Y 
RES. 963, 963–67 (2006). 
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physically healthy children.200 Their diminished health can offset some 
of the gains they would otherwise have made in math and science.201 
Similarly, states might increase teacher qualification standards to 
improve education. Increasing standards will exclude some poor 
teachers, but also dissuade other potentially good teachers from 
pursuing teaching at all. The result could be a near-term shortage of 
teachers and, consequently, larger class sizes, which can have 
counterbalancing negative effects.202 In short, education’s 
polycentricism makes conceptualizing effective educational policy 
difficult. And education’s prevailing ambiguity can make the effects of 
even well-crafted policy immeasurable. 
B.  Externalities to Student Achievement 
Extensive externalities operate on student achievement. The 
externalities of greatest relevance arise from students’ experiences 
outside of school. Regardless of the efforts schools make during the 
day, these externalities can either support or undermine schools’ efforts 
once the school day is over.203 Students’ varying socioeconomic, 
familial, housing, and medical situations (just to name a few) tend to 
correlate with experiences outside of school that significantly affect 
educational outcomes.204 Yet the effect is not only on a student’s own 
individual achievement, but also on the achievement of those around 
him. The concentration of students with particular characteristics—such 
as low or high socioeconomic status—in a school impacts all of the 
students in that school.205 In short, not only do a student’s own 
externalities affect his achievement; other students’ externalities affect 
that student’s achievement.206 Thus, the overall demographic 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Ken Petress, Perils of Current Testing Mandates, 33 J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 80 
(2006). 
 201. Suzanne M. Winter, Childhood Obesity in the Testing Era: What Teachers and 
Schools Can Do!, 85 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 283, 289 (2009). 
 202. See, e.g., Thomas Nechyba et al., Public School Finance and Urban School Policy: 
General Versus Partial Equilibrium Analysis, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN 
AFFAIRS 139, 177 (2003). 
 203. Maryah Stella Fram et al., Poverty, Race and the Contexts of Achievement: Examining 
Educational Experiences of Children in the U.S. South, 52 SOC. WORK 309, 309–11 (2007). 
 204. See generally COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 25; Fram, supra note 203, at 312–16; 
Sara Sepanski Whipple et al., An Ecological Perspective on Cumulative School and 
Neighborhood Risk Factors Related to Achievement, 31 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 422, 422 
(2010). 
 205. See Borman & Dowling, supra note 25, at 1239 (finding group level effects to be 
greater than individual factors). 
 206. See id.; see also SUSAN EATON, NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY HOW THE 
RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS CONTRIBUTES TO 
LITERACY, BEHAVIORAL CLIMATE, INSTRUCTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND HIGH SCHOOL 
GRADUATION RATES, 1–6 (2010) (reviewing research on “the relationship between the racial and 
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characteristics of a school will significantly impact achievement in that 
school, regardless of the school’s academic policies (though schools do 
have the capacity to control their demographics through assignment 
policies). Some schools will have student bodies that are predisposed 
toward success, given that, in addition to what they are learning at 
school, they are learning at home and over the summer. In contrast, 
other schools will be predisposed to fall behind because their students’ 
outside learning opportunities are generally less robust. Of course, all 
these group and individual factors interact with one another, amplifying, 
mitigating, or canceling out one another.207 
The temporal dispersion of learning also increases the number of 
externalities at play and the likelihood that externalities have 
intervened.208 Because student learning occurs across extended periods 
of time, a student’s learning necessarily intersects with innumerable 
factors and experiences. This is not to say that all of these factors and 
experiences are significant, but only that they necessarily come into 
play. The more external possibilities one identifies, the more difficult it 
becomes to infer a causal connection between a challenged educational 
policy and the educational outcome. Even putting significant 
externalities aside, the passage of time alone makes causal inferences 
more challenging because our understanding of causation is largely 
based on the temporal connection between events.209 In the absence of 
temporal proximity, our propensity to infer causation dissipates.210 
Thus, the mere passage of time can raise courts’ skepticism toward an 
educational claim, prompting them to demand more specific causal 
evidence. In short, there is an indefinite number of factors affecting 
student outcomes.211 Time only highlights the problem.212 
                                                                                                                     
socioeconomic composition of a school”); James Paul Gee, Critical Issues: Reading and the 
New Literary Studies: Reframing the National Academy of Sciences Report on Reading, 31 J. 
LITERACY RES. 355, 360 (1999). 
 207. Sarah Archibald, Narrowing in on Educational Resources that Do Affect Student 
Achievement, 81 PEABODY J. EDUC., 23, 35–36 (2006). 
208. See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN 
LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 13 (2009) (indicating that remoteness in time can destroy 
causation); Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to 
Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42–44 (1992) (discussing the importance of 
temporality in causation and ruling out other factors). 
 209. See Brown, supra note 208, at 30. 
 210. See id. 
 211. MARTHA MINOW ET AL., JUST SCHOOLS: PURSUING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF 
DIFFERENCE 26–27 (2008). 
 212. Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 802–04 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that the passage of 
time made the connection between the achievement gap and past discrimination spurious); see 
also Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 643, 653, 655, 658, 660 (2001) (discussing the multitude of factors relating to the 
achievement gap).  
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C.  Educational Policy’s Capacity to Counterbalance Externalities 
The point of accounting for student externalities is to determine the 
extent to which school policy matters, particularly to student 
achievement. Getting to this question, however, is never easy, and the 
answers are rarely satisfying. For instance, as suggested above, the two 
major education litigation movements, desegregation and school 
finance, have struggled with whether the remedies sought would 
improve student outcomes. Early on, courts largely assumed that 
segregation harmed minority students’ achievement and, thus, any 
remedy to segregation would bear positive academic results.213 But as 
the commitment to desegregation waned, both courts and scholars 
began to examine the connection between improved academic 
achievement and integration.214 Although the connection definitely 
exists,215 advocates and courts expected a far stronger and more certain 
connection to justify the continuation of all-out desegregation.216 The 
nearly impossible standards from Dowell and Jenkins are reflections of 
the concern over this causal connection.217 Even today, when social 
scientists have more clearly established a connection between racial 
segregation and academic achievement (primarily because of the 
socioeconomic isolation that accompanies it),218 some members of the 
Court still question the academic impact of integration.219  
The fundamental problem, however, is not that integration and 
money fail to impact student outcomes, but that they are not silver 
bullets and their impact is not as overwhelming as courts and policy 
makers might expect. Decades of research, including federally funded 
studies by the Department of Education, indicate that socioeconomically 
integrative and segregative policies significantly impact student 
achievement.220 Even opponents of desegregation concede this point.221 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Ryan, supra note 76, at 1673. This is not to suggest that the only harm of segregation 
was academic. Segregation, without question, produced equally, if not more, harmful stigmatic 
effects. See Brown, supra note 208, at 50. 
 214. MINOW, supra note 211, at 26–27; Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1706. 
 215. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 839–40 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1624–35. 
 216. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1509–13; see Parker, supra note 68, at 522–34 
(analyzing the Court’s tightening of the evidentiary basis for desegregation remedies). 
 217. Parker, supra note 68, at 519–21, 524; Ryan, supra note 76, at 1673. 
 218. See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 85 
(1995). 
 219. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 761 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Michael Heise, 
Brown Undone?: The Future of Integration in Seattle after Pics v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863–64 (2008). 
 220. COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 25, at 21–22. 
 221. ARMOR, supra note 218, at 83–86 (indicating that poverty isolation was a cause of low 
African-American achievement). 
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The problem is that neither integrative policies, nor any other school 
policy for that matter, fully control student achievement. Student 
achievement is necessarily affected by the various externalities 
discussed above. Each factor, including school policies, has only an 
incremental effect on achievement,222 and no single factor or 
educational policy can explain or eradicate education failure alone.223 
Thus, the analytical flaw of courts and skeptics can be to expect an 
overwhelming causal effect from educational policy. No one can fairly 
criticize integration as failing to affect student achievement. At best, 
one might criticize the academic effect of integration as being too 
limited or failing to justify its costs. But such criticism is endemic to 
most any educational policy, as all must contend with the externalities 
that counteract educational policy. Nonetheless, the inability to 
demonstrate that students’ low or increased academic achievement is 
primarily the result of school policy is a barrier for education litigation. 
Too often the implicit expectation remains that individual educational 
policies render externalities moot,224 while the stated assumption is that 
externalities are so significant that courts doubt reforms can do anything 
to close achievement gaps. In short, skeptics charge that achievement 
gaps are intractable but then criticize education reform for failing to 
wipe them out. 
A similar set of expectations regarding the connection between 
school policy and student outcomes exists in school finance. But there 
the connection can be even more difficult to discern because certain 
fundamental underlying variances between districts can appear to cancel 
out the effect of varying financial resources in some localities. First, the 
basic cost of schooling and the capacity to finance it varies from district 
to district.225 School districts vary in terms of their tax base, student 
needs, and costs of operation.226 As of yet, no reliable, exact standard 
exists to compare districts across these measures.227 One might account 
for the variances in local costs associated with facilities, transportation, 
and other non-instructional operations, as well as the funds that school 
districts are currently raising, but the question of how much money any 
district actually needs in order to offer an adequate education or 
improve achievement includes some level of speculation or 
                                                                                                                     
 222. See Whipple, supra note 204, at 426. 
 223. Balfanz & Byrnes, supra note 192, at 151; see also DeMitchell & DeMitchell, supra 
note 193. 
 224. See Adams, supra note 212, at 652, 660 (critiquing a requirement that past segregation 
be the sole or primary cause of the achievement gap to justify an affirmative action plan). 
 225. See generally BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL 
REPORT CARD 5, 7, 14–18 (2010), http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_ 
2010.pdf; Nechyba et al., supra note 202, at 142–44. 
 226. BAKER ET AL., supra note 225, at 14–18; Nechyba et al., supra note 202, at 142–44. 
 227. BAKER ET AL., supra note 225, at 12. 
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assumption.228 For instance, teachers have preferences as to where they 
teach and live that affect the cost of hiring them.229 While some studies 
offer broad generalities regarding how much it would cost to attract 
high-quality teachers to needier schools and localities,230 these 
generalities are far from sufficient to set specific budgets for every 
district in a state. Moreover, if a state allotted funds to needy districts, 
but those funds were insufficient to attract high-quality teachers to 
certain areas, student achievement would likely remain flat in some 
areas even though teacher salaries increased. From this, one might infer 
that money does not matter, when in fact the problem is that we do not 
know how much money a particular location needs. 
The second and interrelated problem is that schools allocate their 
available funds in different ways, which makes determining whether 
those funds are sufficient to meet their varying geographic and 
demographic needs extremely difficult.231 For instance, money might 
not appear to matter much if all schools have resources in excess of 
their need, as the surplus funds are spent on frivolous items.232 
Conversely, if no schools have enough money, one presumably would 
see qualitative differences between them based on how short of funds 
each school is. But this assumption will not always hold true because in 
                                                                                                                     
 228. The estimates have ranged from an additional 40%–60%. See, e.g., No Child Left 
Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333(a)(1), 6337(b)(1) (2006) (40% funding increase adjustment); 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INEQUALITIES IN PUB. SCH. DIST. REVENUES 
62 (1998) (40% adjustment appropriate); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SCH. FIN.: PER-PUPIL SPENDING 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SELECTED INNER CITY AND SUBURBAN SCHOOLS VARIED BY 
METROPOLITAN AREA 30 (2002); Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, Educ. Trust, How States 
Shortchange the Districts That Need the Most Help, in FUNDING GAPS 2006, 5, 6 (2006) (noting 
a 60% adjustment, but using 40%). 
 229. Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 
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(1999). 
 230. See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
TEACHERS IN LOW-PERFORMING HIGH SCHOOLS 7 (2008), http://www.all4ed.org/files/Teach 
Dist_PolicyBrief.pdf (finding pay incentive alone has been insufficient to attract teachers); 
Hanushek, supra note 229, at 350 (finding a 10% salary increase necessary for each increase of 
10% in minority student enrollment to induce white females to teach in the school); id. at 351 
(finding that a 25%–40% salary increase would be necessary to induce white females with two 
or fewer years of experience to transfer from teaching in a suburban to an urban school). 
 231. See generally William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School 
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision As a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 615 (1994) 
(noting that local variances make determining whether state funding is sufficient difficult); 
JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 7–8 (2010). 
 232. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990) (“[S]ince all districts in the state have 
much more than whatever the minimum amount may be, the excess and the differences in the 
excess, are irrelevant to the quality of education.”). 
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the absence of sufficient funds schools make different strategic 
choices—some wiser than others—about how to allocate limited 
resources, which will result in some schools doing better or worse than 
others in ways that do not relate to how much money they have.233 
Thus, while we know that districts vary substantially in what they spend 
on schools and in their capacity to raise more funds,234 precisely 
identifying the extent to which money matters even in the poorest and 
wealthiest districts is more complex because some schools with excess 
surely squander funds and struggling schools vary in their response to 
the shortage.  In short, even if one can generally establish that money 
matters, the basic question of how much money is necessary to put 
schools on equal footing lingers.  
None of the foregoing is to suggest that money does not matter. The 
foregoing simply reveals that, even though we might be certain that 
money matters, we are not certain how much it matters, nor how much 
more we should afford to needy schools. We know that “money is only 
one of a number of elements [involved in education]”235 and is not the 
sole or main determinant of education. Thus, its impact, like any other 
educational policy, is going to be limited and subject to causal attack.  
D.  Indefinite Educational Harms 
Education claims also suffer from a relative inability to identify and 
quantify student harms. First, the primary method of assessing students 
is through achievement, for which we have no reliable measure. 
Currently, the primary method for student outcome evaluation is 
through standardized tests.236 Yet standardized tests do not necessarily 
capture the full effect of particular educational policies.237 While 
standardized testing data is valuable, educational researchers have 
lodged a bevy of criticisms against standardized tests, including that 
they do not accurately reflect student learning or, at least, the most 
important types of learning.238 Regardless, a policy might very well 
                                                                                                                     
 233. Id. at 404 (noting that money likely matters, but “can be used more effectively than it 
is being used today”). 
 234. BAKER ET AL., supra note 225, at 26; Nechyba et al., supra note 202, at 155, 157. 
 235. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 404 (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 
129, 132 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 236. Michael Heise, Courting Trouble: Litigation, High-Stakes Testing and Education 
Policy, 42 IND. L. REV. 327, 341 (2009); W. James Popham, Standarized Testing Fails the 
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reform. 
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2000); Robert L. Linn, Assessments and Accountability, EDUC. RESEARCHER 4, 7, 10, 12 (2000); 
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Programs 1 (2008). 
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impede a student’s learning, but not in a way that affects the student’s 
standardized test achievement.239 Or the effect may not be large enough 
to produce a significant change on a standardized test.240 Thus, the 
primary method of establishing harm leaves plaintiffs in a quandary by 
failing to reveal harms that otherwise exist. Second, even were 
standardized tests a valid indicator of student learning, knowing 
whether an education policy caused harm in that respect requires some 
knowledge of how the student would have performed had a different 
policy been in place, which, as discussed previously, involves a 
significant degree of speculation.241 Thus, the best one can do is to infer 
a general harm based on statistical analyses of how other students 
perform.  
Third, and related, educational harms tend to be marginal. Rather 
than absolute deprivations of opportunity, students most often 
experience marginal differences in educational opportunity.242 
Likewise, student achievement operates on a sliding rather than an 
absolute scale.243 Thus, the harm an inequality might cause is marginal, 
particularly when measured by standardized tests (which continue to be 
affected by student externalities). For instance, consider a student who 
is incorrectly suspended from school for three days, a school that 
incorrectly diagnoses a student’s disability in the fall semester but 
corrects it in the spring, or a student assignment policy that causes the 
poverty level in a school to rise from 60% to 70%. Even if the conduct 
were faulty in all of these examples, the change in most students’ end-
of-year performance on standardized tests will be small at worst and, 
thus, the harm marginal.   
While few would doubt that each of these policies harmed students 
in some meaningful way, the inability to quantify a substantial harm can 
be the legal equivalent of not causing any harm at all. For instance, 
despite what might be gross educational failures by a school, some 
courts have dismissed educational malpractice claims because they 
questioned whether the student could demonstrate that the school had 
caused a measurable harm.244 Likewise, some have rejected segregation 
and school finance claims because the exact extent of the harm is 
                                                                                                                     
 239. See Linn, supra note 237, at 7–8. 
 240. See, e.g., W. James Popham, A Test is a Test—Not!, 64 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 88 (2006) 
(critiquing standardized tests results as “fog[ging] over the effects of the instructional 
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 241. See Kane & Staiger, supra note 194, at 2–3. 
 242. See generally W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don’t Measure Educational 
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 244. See supra note 159. 
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minimal or unquantifiable, even though students surely suffered some 
harm.245 In this respect, education tends to stand in stark contrast to 
other areas of the law. Harms to non-educational interests—either 
because they are conceptualized differently or are absolute—are not 
subject to the ambiguities that breed skepticism about education claims. 
For instance, in housing, individuals are denied and granted apartments 
or homes; in employment, jobs, promotions, or raises. In tort claims, 
plaintiffs suffer physical or property damage. In these cases, most often 
the hurdle is not to establish the harm itself or that the defendant caused 
it, but that the defendant’s conduct was faulty.246 In contrast, with the 
exception of proving intentional discrimination, the faulty educational 
conduct that creates unequal funding, denies opportunity, or mislabels 
students can be relatively obvious, while causation and harm are not. 
Fourth, as suggested above, because educational harms are 
marginal, they are often only reliably identifiable at the aggregate 
level.247 But identifying aggregate harm generally reveals very little 
about whether a particular student or smaller subset of students, such as 
a school or district, has been harmed, much less how much harm an 
individual or smaller subset of students has suffered. By analyzing 
statewide or national data, one might establish the general principle that 
concentrated poverty or teacher quality affects student achievement. Yet 
identifying a harm or its exact extent at the level of an individual 
student, school, or district might be impossible.  
Fifth, educational harms can be latent. For instance, the harm caused 
by the failure to fully expose children to appropriate reading 
opportunities in early grades may not manifest itself for years.248 
Because all children are initially novice or developing readers, the 
differences between the properly educated child and other children are 
smaller in early grades.249 Consequently, immediately identifying the 
harm and attributing it to a school’s action may be impossible in many 
instances. That small difference between students, however, can grow 
exponentially over time and lead to a large disparity.250 Yet, while the 
passage of time may make the disparity obvious, it will not necessarily 
make the causal connection to the school’s action obvious. In fact, it 
                                                                                                                     
 245. See supra notes 48–72 and 156–162 and accompanying text. 
 246. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965). 
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will do the opposite because the passage of time increases the 
possibility that external factors have intervened and contributed to the 
harm. Furthermore, the passage of time decreases the likelihood that 
anyone will realize that a school’s action years ago may have 
contributed to the harm. In effect, the long-past educational decision can 
get lost among the numerous other potential causes, from which little 
sense will likely be made.  
In sum, the general ambiguity of education manifests itself in a 
series of concrete evidentiary problems. The most obvious ones relate to 
the various externalities that affect schools and students. These 
externalities make identifying the causal connection between 
educational policies and student achievement difficult. Even if a causal 
connection can be established, plaintiffs may still be unable to 
demonstrate an exact harm. Educational harms are often marginal, 
latent, or group-based, and rarely individual and obvious. Yet, in the 
absence of clear and substantial harm, courts tend to reject educational 
claims, notwithstanding otherwise faulty conduct by a defendant. 
III.  SUSTAINING EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENTS IN SPITE OF 
EVIDENCE: THE LESSON OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 
The success of charter schools suggests a potential way out of the 
general rule of inevitable reform failure. Charter schools have a weaker 
evidentiary basis than most other educational civil rights reforms, but 
have nonetheless continued to expand. In fact, charter schools have 
expanded in spite of evidence that very few outperform regular public 
schools. Other educational civil rights movements have been cut short 
based on far less. Charter schools have managed to succeed where 
others have failed because their existence is not primarily based or 
contingent on an evidentiary argument. Instead, charter schools make 
particular value- and moral-based claims that resonate with broad 
constituencies. These constituencies amount to a social movement for 
charter schools that demands attention and is not easily dissuaded. In 
contrast, educational civil rights movements, as of late, have failed to 
make compelling value-based demands on society or inspire social 
movements. As a result, these movements have remained at the mercy 
of education’s inherent ambiguities. While civil rights advocates raise 
valid concerns with charter schools, they would be better served by 
learning from charter schools than by attacking them. Halting the 
decline of educational civil rights reforms will only come from 
rekindling their moral base, not from waging the same policy and 
evidentiary wars that have lead them to their current situation. 
A.  The Rapid Rise of Charter Schools 
Charter schools have enjoyed tremendous growth and policy support 
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over the past two decades. The first charter school did not open until 
1992 in Minnesota and, at the time, only one state other than Minnesota 
had legislation that even authorized the creation of a charter school.251 
The next year, eight states authorized the creation of charter schools, 
and the actual number of charter schools in operation grew to thirty-
six.252 Three years later, over half of the states had authorized the 
creation of charter schools, and the number of charter schools continued 
to expand exponentially, doubling each year for several consecutive 
years.253 Today, there are over five thousand charter schools in 
operation254 and approximately 1.6 million children enrolled in them.255 
Only ten states now lack charter school legislation, five of which are in 
the upper northwest where student populations are relatively small and 
deconcentrated.256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal legislation has, likewise, rapidly changed over the past two 
decades. It has gone from expressing passing interest to now attempting 
to force states to adopt charters. The first federal funding of charter 
schools was in 1995 and a mere $6 million appropriation.257 Within just 
five years, Congress had increased the appropriation to $145 million,258 
which represented incredible growth, but was still a small amount 
relative to other education funding. This trend of increase continued in 
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subsequent years, and charter schools are currently a dominant federal 
strategy. In 2009, the Obama administration created a $4.3 billion 
competitive grant program (“Race to the Top”) designed to spur specific 
changes in educational policy.259 States’ eligibility for a grant was 
contingent on promoting charter schools and eliminating barriers to 
their growth.260 As the Secretary of Education proclaimed: “States that 
do not have public charter laws or put artificial caps on the growth of 
charter schools will jeopardize their applications under the Race to the 
Top Fund . . . We want real autonomy for charters combined with a 
rigorous authorization process and high performance standards.”261 In 
response, many states quickly dropped their long-standing resistance to 
charters, the most important of which were explicit caps on the number 
of charter schools that could operate in a state.262 Today, quite simply, 
the fascination with charter schools is so intense that charter schools 
effectively suck the air out of the conversation regarding education 
reform. Other reform policies do not appear to be judged on their 
merits, but rather on their consistency with or relationship to a charter 
school agenda. It is increasingly revealing that charter schools have 
become the default reform strategy and alternative to traditional public 
schools.263 The most obvious example is in New Orleans, where the 
plan to rebuild the city’s ineffective system after Hurricane Katrina was 
almost exclusively based on charter schools. After the storm, nearly 
60% of the schools in the city were charters.264 
B.  Charter School Performance 
The meteoric rise of charter schools implies that a solid research 
base or track record establishes their effectiveness in delivering quality 
education and improving educational outcomes. No such reliable 
evidence or track record exists, which would come as a surprise to 
many, including parents who have their children enrolled in charter 
schools. To be clear and fair, several charter schools perform amazingly 
well. For instance, the KIPP charter schools (Knowledge is Power 
Program) have produced impressive results, in large part by using the 
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flexibility of the charter school model to deliver 60% more instructional 
time than traditional public schools.265 Students who remain in KIPP 
charter schools have made huge achievements,266 moving from being 
several years behind their peers in learning to outperforming almost all 
of their peers.267 Several non-KIPP charter schools are likewise 
successful. In Massachusetts, already a top state in academic 
performance, charter schools held three of the top ten slots on the state’s 
tenth grade math test in 2008.268 While these results are not the norm for 
charter schools, several studies indicate that a substantial portion of 
charter schools have outperformed public schools. In fact, nationally, 
15% to 20% of charter schools significantly outperform public 
schools.269 
The value these charter schools add to the communities they serve 
cannot be overstated, but, on the whole, charter schools struggle to 
perform at levels comparable to public schools and frequently 
underperform significantly. Only a few national studies of charter 
schools have been completed, but when comparing similarly situated 
students in traditional public schools and charter schools, the studies 
reach the same result: students in charter schools underperform. The 
U.S. Department of Education studied the results of the 2003 and 2007 
National Assessment of Educational Progress and found that charter 
school students underperformed regular public school students in fourth 
grade reading, fourth grade math, and eighth grade math.270 The only 
area in which they even performed on par with public schools on these 
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measures was in eighth grade reading.271 A 2009 national study by 
Stanford University researchers was even more pointed. The study 
found that over 80% of charter schools perform the same or worse than 
public schools.272 A full 37% of charter schools performed significantly 
worse than comparable public schools.273  
Those studies that present charter schools as high-performing and 
good alternatives to traditional public schools tend to leave out 
important facts and compare apples to oranges. First, these studies do 
not establish that inner-city charter schools are outperforming public 
schools in general. Rather, at most, they establish that charter schools 
are outperforming nearby public schools or public schools in their 
school districts.274 Second, although some charter schools do 
outperform local public schools, studies promoting this conclusion want 
to have their cake and eat it too. They argue comparisons to public 
schools in general are unfair because of demographic differences, and 
suggest that the appropriate comparison is to local public schools 
because they have comparable demographics.275 While the former point 
may be accurate, the latter is not because charter schools frequently 
enroll substantially smaller proportions of special education and English 
Language Learner students than the schools in their communities.276 In 
addition, the fact that charter schools require affirmative effort by 
parents to enroll their children would tend to indicate that charter 
schools have student bodies with highly motivated students or parents 
who are predisposed toward higher achievement,277 which again 
distinguishes them from the general student population, even if that 
population is local. In short, studies finding that charter schools are 
outperforming public schools tend to compare a motivated, monolithic 
group of nondisabled students who speak English as a first language to 
a local population that includes students with low levels of familial 
support, low levels of motivation, learning disabilities, and language 
barriers. When the achievement of students in charter schools is 
compared to the achievement of demographically similar students in 
regular public schools, the illusion of outstanding performance 
disappears. Once these factors are taken into account, the most 
favorable appraisal of charter schools is that “none of the studies detects 
                                                                                                                     
 271. Robelen, supra note 270. 
 272. See CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 2, at 1. 
 273. Id.  
 274. See generally RAVITCH, supra note 265, at 138–44. 
 275. See generally RAVITCH, supra note 265, at 138–44. 
 276. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 2, 3, 12; see also Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture 
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huge effects—either positive or negative” of attending a charter 
school.278  
C.  Value-Based Movements Versus Evidentiary Claims 
The crucial question for educational civil rights advocates is how 
charter schools have garnered so much support in the past two decades, 
based on such thin evidence, when civil rights remedies have lost so 
much ground, despite relatively strong evidence supporting them. The 
answer is that charter schools have gained traction, in large part, based 
on the values and principles they represent, not the evidence behind 
them.279 Charter schools are premised on the importance of individual 
choice and the power of markets to produce beneficial outcomes.280 
Charter school advocates argue that, because traditional public schools 
are insular bureaucracies, they are shielded from competitive pressure 
and lack the capacity to change. A market-based system of schooling 
would weed out weak schools, reward good ones, and over time 
produce a system of high-quality schools.281 Parental autonomy and 
individual rights also dictate that parents and students should not be 
restricted to the poor public schools to which a district might assign 
them, but rather should have the choice to attend school elsewhere.282 
Regardless of what the evidence suggests about charter school 
performance, these two key values create a built-in constituency for 
charter schools: communities with low quality schools, parents in all 
communities who want choice for various personal reasons, and the 
business community. Many inner-city communities have been 
disaffected from the educational system for some time, as meaningful 
and stable school desegregation never occurred and adequate resources, 
teachers, curriculum, and pedagogy have generally been in short 
supply.283 In addition, some inner-city communities see public schools 
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as simply a small piece of a much larger system designed to move poor 
minority students seamlessly toward jail.284 Thus, despite national civil 
rights leaders’ opposition to charter schools,285 many inner-city 
communities have been quick to seize the opportunity to opt out of 
traditional public schools.286 Even if a charter school proved no more 
academically effective than a public school, parents express value in the 
opportunity to control their children’s destiny for the first time, and 
skepticism toward waiting for the eventual vindication of civil rights 
principles.287  
Although smaller in number, parents from other communities also 
share inner-city parents’ interest in school choice. A substantial number 
of parents believe in choice not because they need an alternative to 
traditional public schools, but because choice is a fundamental value for 
them.288 Even where public schools are effective, substantial numbers 
of parents send their children to private school or home school, for a 
variety of reasons. For these parents (and libertarians), the ability to 
choose their children’s schools and more directly control their education 
is a basic parental right that the state has no legitimate authority to 
constrain.289 
Finally, charter schools appeal to the business community on both a 
practical and theoretical level. Charter school legislation creates a new 
market for business.290 In the past, the business community’s only 
opportunity to enter the primary and secondary education sector was 
through private schools. But this market is relatively small because it is 
                                                                                                                     
Becoming Barriers to Charter School Innovation, 144 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 19 (2000) (noting 
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 288. Ellen B. Goldring & Kristie J.R. Phillips, Parent Preference and Parent Choices: The 
Public-private Decision About School Choice, 23 J. EDUC. POL’Y 209, 212 (2008); see also 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85–107 (2002). 
 289. See Goldring & Phillips, supra note 288; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 535 (1925); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
 290. James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging 
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limited to wealthier individuals who can finance their children’s 
education.291 Charter school legislation effectively opens the public 
education market up to private competition, and finances that 
competition by covering the cost of sending students to privately 
managed schools. But most in the business community have little 
interest in running a school and reap no direct monetary benefit from 
charter schools. For this larger business community, charter schools 
have a value-based appeal because they are run more like businesses 
and subject to competition that they believe is sorely needed in 
education.292 In short, charter school legislation amounts to no less than 
a validation of the business model. 
These charter school constituents are important because they help 
create a movement rather than just a policy agenda for charter 
schools.293 This movement is based on values, not social science or 
academic outcomes.294 Thus, these constituents can remain in favor of 
charter schools regardless of the charges detractors might levy. Parents 
can severely discount evidence that charter schools do not improve 
educational outcomes when their primary support for charter schools is 
based on choice, not results.295 This is not to say that such evidence is 
irrelevant, as surely all hoped charter schools would offer their children 
better educational opportunities, but the evidence is not decisive. The 
business community may be even less susceptible to persuasion. It is 
hard to imagine how one convinces the business community that market 
principles do not work in schools. Regardless of what evidence is 
available, the business community is not going to concede that the very 
values upon which it has succeeded are flawed. Moreover, the business 
community is quick to respond that the market will work if given 
enough time.296  
For these reasons, charter school policy has been heavily supported 
and resistant to critique. By promoting charters based on values as much 
as evidence, supporters created a valued-based movement that has 
propelled charter schools into expanded existence. A movement based 
on values, unlike one based on evidence, draws far more committed 
                                                                                                                     
 291. Private schools serve 10% of the student population, and the average tuition at private 
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supporters, and their primary motivations are not really subject to 
debate or contingent on effective performance of the underlying policy. 
Thus, the causal gaps that have ultimately operated to limit every major 
civil rights education reform movement have not impeded charter 
schools. Of course, they may still bring down charter schools in the 
future, but the point here is that charter schools have made it this far in 
spite of the evidence because of a powerful value-based movement. 
When viewed in this light, charter schools stand in stark contrast to 
the current status of most educational civil rights movements. Yet they 
also resemble civil rights movements at various times in the past. By 
focusing on the extent to which value-based social movements and 
interests were afoot, the failures and uneven trajectories of civil rights 
and other education reforms make far more sense. For instance, as 
described earlier, the struggle for desegregation is really a tale of two 
different histories: one of rapid expansion and another of consistent 
contraction. But what the earlier Section did not thoroughly address was 
desegregation’s value-based claim. In its earliest stages, desegregation 
was as much a moral claim as a legal claim.297 Its moral claim was hard 
to deny, while its legal and evidentiary claims were far less certain.298 
Likewise, improving academic outcomes for minority students was 
important, but not necessarily the driving force. Rather, bringing down 
racial apartheid was an end in and of itself.299 The very existence of 
forced segregation was an affront to African-Americans’ humanity, 
regardless of the academic effect. Moreover, segregation created serious 
internal contradictions in society. As Professor Derrick Bell emphasized 
throughout his life, the country’s need to resolve the contradiction 
between its theoretical commitment to freedom and equality and its 
domestic reality of discrimination and inequality lead to the Court’s 
holding in Brown.300 
Value-based arguments focused on these issues—rather than any 
particular evidence—eventually made it possible for a moral majority to 
rally around desegregation.301 The coalescing of a moral majority 
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brought supportive civil rights legislation, judicial enforcement, and a 
rapid expansion of desegregation throughout the South during the late 
1960s and early 1970s.302 But when desegregation moved outside the 
South and the image of stark apartheid was no longer apparent, the 
moral imperative weakened, and various other practicalities suddenly 
became relevant.303 In fact, it was this very dilemma that Justice Lewis 
Powell emphasized in his opinion in Keyes when he wrote: 
No comparable progress has been made in many 
nonsouthern cities with large minority populations 
primarily because of the de facto/de jure distinction 
nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many 
of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated 
schools in the South. But if our national concern is for 
those who attend such schools, rather than for perpetuating 
a legalism rooted in history rather than present reality, we 
must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools is 
no less in Denver than in Atlanta.304 
The majority of the Court saw the issue differently. 
Beginning in Keyes and continuing the next year in Milliken, 
desegregation morphed from a moral imperative that commanded a 
movement, to legal and social policy that was up for debate and 
scrutiny. Once that shift occurred, the inherent causal gaps of education 
were readily available to limit and end desegregation.305 Since then, 
desegregation has never been able to rearticulate itself in strong value- 
or justice-based terms.306 Instead, desegregation today is largely 
relegated to being an effective academic policy that school districts 
ought to adopt of their own volition,307 but it is largely devoid of a 
compelling moral or value claim. As a result, desegregation continues to 
decline in relevance with each year that passes.308 
The successes and failures of school finance do not fit as neatly into 
the framework of value- and justice-based claims as desegregation 
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because of the myriad different circumstances and factors at play in the 
various states. But the idea that long-term school finance success is as 
dependent on building an extrajudicial movement and appealing to 
values as the strength of any underlying evidentiary claim still 
resonates. As a general matter, successful school finance litigation has 
often resulted in judicial opinions that are about far more than the 
evidence, the text of the constitution, or the existence of inequality. 
First, successful school finance opinions have frequently arisen out of 
the existence of deplorable schools that morally shame the state.309 For 
instance, in New York, the plaintiffs presented evidence that school 
buildings were overcrowded and suffered from “leaky roofs, deficient 
heating, and other problems,”310 and raised the question of whether 
some were hazardous.311 The evidence presented an even bleaker 
picture in Ohio. There, the state supreme court wrote of floors so thin 
that teachers’ feet would fall through them, structures beset by asbestos 
but denied the money to abate it, coal heating systems that would cover 
student desks with coal dust overnight, walls that were literally 
crumbling, and plaster that was literally falling.312 Like Brown, 
conditions of this sort appear unjust and, regardless of the details of 
constitutional intent, jurists and the public must struggle with the 
question of how the Constitution could possibly tolerate the situation. 
Second, courts have framed these cases in terms of how much is at 
stake for disadvantaged students as a way of elevating the state’s 
responsibility. A trial court in South Carolina emphasized the negative 
effects of poverty and the fact that the education system was students’ 
primary opportunity to escape. The court found that “poverty is . . . both 
the parent and the child of poor academic achievement. Each follows 
the other in a debilitating and destructive cycle until some outside 
agency or force interrupts the sequence.”313 Thus, the effects of poverty 
on education must be addressed “as early as possible in the lives of the 
children affected by it.”314 This judicially articulated moral imperative 
helps explain why the trial court followed the supreme court’s mandate 
and ordered not just reforms to the education system, but 
prekindergarten services for poor students.315 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has been even more forthright in its equity and justice concerns 
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over poor children’s plight, writing:  
We realize . . . that no amount of money may be able to 
erase the impact of the socioeconomic factors that define 
and cause these pupils’ disadvantages [and] that perhaps 
nothing short of substantial social and economic change 
affecting housing, employment, child care, taxation, [and] 
welfare will make the difference for these 
students . . . . [But] even if not a cure, money will help, 
and . . . these students are constitutionally entitled to that 
help. 
If the claim is that additional funding will not enable 
the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and 
efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are 
entitled to pass or fail with at least the same amount of 
money as their competitors.316  
Although not as pointedly, other courts have seized upon similar 
themes in describing the long-term effects of inequitable and inadequate 
education on society. A common rhetorical method in some states has 
been to speak of education in terms of what students need to succeed in 
life,317 deserve as a matter of fairness, or would be entitled to if they 
lived in some other neighboring state.318 When courts write in these 
terms, they are not making the case that their respective state 
constitutions intended to guarantee a specific result, but that if their 
constitutions are just they must.  
Finally, the most important factor in the implementation of 
meaningful remedies in school finance is the existence of popular 
support or a coordinated movement. Extrajudicial support is at least 
indirectly, if not directly, motivated by moral and social claims. 
Litigation alone is but a piece of a much larger puzzle in the struggle to 
secure equal or adequate education. The events that follow a judicial 
opinion, rather than the opinion itself, dictate success.319 The most 
obvious examples are in those states where voters have simply removed 
justices who supported education reform from office, and replaced them 
                                                                                                                     
 316. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990). 
 317. See Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 317 (Kan. 2005) (Beier, J., concurring) 
(“Education is vital for each citizen and no less imperative for the survival and progress of our 
republic.”). 
 318. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 391 n.6 (Vt. 1997).  
 319. See Matt Brooker, Comment, Riding the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: 
Navigating Troubled Waters, 75 UMKC L. REV. 183, 187 (2006); Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at 
the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2006). 
56
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/6
2012] CIVIL RIGHTS, CHARTER SCHOOLS, AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 1779 
 
 
with others who promptly reversed their predecessors’ holdings.320 In 
these states, school finance advocates failed to build larger social 
movements and gain political support, which allowed raw political 
power to trump constitutional history, precedent, and rights.  
Though not always as dramatic, similar principles play out in state 
legislatures after a court issues its decision. As Professor James Ryan’s 
scholarship reveals, the most meaningful battle for school finance 
reform is won or lost in the legislature.321 Separation of powers prevents 
courts from compelling the legislature to act.322 An actual remedy for 
educational inadequacy and inequity only comes through legislation that 
is palatable to political majorities in the legislature. Certainly, state 
supreme courts play an important role in initiating reform and offer 
legislators cover in doing the right thing, but moral, racial, and social 
concerns weigh heavily regardless of a court’s decision.323 Thus, 
bringing actual reform to schools ultimately depends on elections, social 
movements, and the persuasiveness of the justice claims advocates 
frame. As Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon argue, the 
primary function of school finance litigation is to secure a seat at the 
decision-making table for otherwise excluded groups.324 But a seat, of 
course, does not guarantee a desired result. Rather, a seat at the table 
only provides the opportunity to exert influence on decision makers and 
popular sentiment,325 both of which are dependent on public values and 
support, not necessarily evidentiary and legal conclusions.  
The No Child Left Behind Act may be the most recent and salient 
example of education reform quickly doomed by disregard for 
developing a constituency. The flaw in NCLB’s causal claim was  
detrimental because the Act lacked a constituency. To suggest the Act 
lacked a broad-based constituency from the outset seems 
counterintuitive, given that it was passed with bipartisan support.326 Yet 
NCLB’s ardent supporters were largely limited to the Washington 
political establishment, corporate interests demanding “results,” and 
testing agencies.327 States were immediately fearful of the Act’s 
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unobtainable goals and sanctions,328 and only reluctantly capitulated to 
the Act after they were promised funding and safety valves for 
failure.329 Communities were not necessarily hostile toward the bill, but 
neither were they supportive. Whether a community had good or bad 
schools, no significant constituency was calling for increased testing as 
a means to improve education.330  
As previously described, NCLB was a bill that had to be sold to the 
public rather than a bill the community demanded. While the causal 
claim was central to selling the bill, supporters also offered a moral or 
justice claim. The Act’s title itself indirectly asserted that we had 
abandoned a subset of children and were now obligated to respond. 
President Bush consistently pushed this claim to its moral extremes, 
arguing that poor and minority children were suffering from the “soft 
bigotry of low expectations.”331 The notion that schools were not 
intentionally discriminating against students, but that their low 
expectations were a subtle form of discrimination, resonated.332 This 
claim made the Act difficult to oppose and allowed many to go along 
with the bill, even though they were not committed supporters. For 
instance, civil rights leaders could easily condone a bill aimed at 
eliminating this bias, even if it was ineffective. And if nothing else, civil 
rights leaders believed the Act’s testing and data regime, more than any 
other policy in the past, would expose the vast inequality and hypocrisy 
in public education.333 The point is that neither the civil rights nor any 
other community was leading the fight for this bill. Rather, the small 
Washington constituency pushing the Act secured others’ tacit 
agreement by asserting a moral claim. But when the central causal 
premise of the Act failed, its moral claim rang hollow and its lack of a 
committed constituency was exposed. States and communities quickly 
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lost all tolerance for the Act.334 Even the Act’s initial supporters began 
harshly criticizing it.335 By the 2008 elections, presidential and 
congressional candidates almost uniformly opposed the Act and 
promised to gut or seriously revamp it.336 In short, NCLB is just another 
example of education reform premised on an evidentiary claim and 
lacking a movement, the absence of which spells the quick end of 
reform.  
CONCLUSION 
The various educational civil rights movements have had a long and 
storied history, which includes periods of both significant rights 
expansion and contraction. Because litigation has been so central to 
these movements, the temptation is to view them solely through the 
evidence they develop and the judiciary’s evaluation of it. Viewed in 
this light, the successes and failures of movements appear dependent on 
the quality of the war waged at trial and the potential predilections of 
appellate courts. To be clear, strong litigation movements have achieved 
numerous successes, but these litigation reform movements have also 
uniformly and inevitably been cut short.  
While the instinct of many litigators and civil rights advocates is to 
marshal better evidence, evidence cannot provide the solution. Even 
during times of success, educational civil rights claims have not been 
free from evidentiary gaps. Rather, courts were simply willing to 
overlook them. The unfortunate truth is that the nature of education 
itself breeds causal ambiguity. Because so many factors affect 
educational outcomes, and learning occurs over time rather than 
instantaneously, it is nearly impossible to establish that a given 
educational policy—such as an additional $1,000 of per pupil 
spending—will produce a particular outcome for any particular group of 
students. In general, the most evidence can do is reveal trends and 
identify the likelihood of outcomes. And as movements age, courts (and 
legislatures) eventually grow skeptical of the claims, and generalized 
evidence becomes insufficient to sustain the movement. In fact, some 
are skeptical from the outset of a movement, and the evidence does 
                                                                                                                     
 334. See, e.g., Criticism of NCLB Mounts as Numerous Schools Are Identified as “In Need 
of Improvement,” EDUCATION ACCESS (Aug. 28, 2003), http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/fe 
deral/8-28-03nclbcriticism.php3 (indicating that criticism of the Act from the local level was 
already mounting just one year after the Act was passed). 
 335. Gail Russell Chaddock, “No Child Left Behind” Losing Steam, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (March 21, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0321/p01s01-legn.html. 
 336. Interestingly, the Act has yet to be reformed. This is attributable to various factors 
having nothing to do with education. Regardless, the Department of Education has agreed to 
waive the Act’s various requirements rather than wait for Congress to revise it. See Dillon, 
supra note 168. 
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nothing to change their minds. No examples exist where educational 
civil rights advocates have been able to reverse skepticism or retraction 
with newfound and better evidence. The required evidence simply does 
not exist in education. 
Given this unfortunate reality, educational civil rights reform either 
is futile in the long term or must fortify itself with more than evidence. 
The recent rise of charter schools reveals that the answer may be in the 
latter. In comparison to the other civil rights movements, the evidence 
supporting charter schools is less than impressive. Yet charter schools 
have expanded exponentially, while most traditional civil rights 
movements have done the converse, and the rest may be on the verge. 
Charter schools have been able to defy the odds because they are reliant 
on a social movement and values, rather than evidence. In important 
respects, the evidence supporting charter schools is simply irrelevant 
and overshadowed by charter schools’ direct appeal to parents’ and 
business leaders’ fundamental values, both of whom comprise an 
unflinching constituency that pushes charter school policy forward at all 
levels of government.  
Of course, educational civil rights claims have not always been 
without their moral- and value-based claims. In fact, a holistic review of 
the trajectory of past victories suggests that the moral- and value-based 
claims, rather than actual evidence, propelled these movements. Today, 
however, advocates often struggle to articulate educational civil rights 
in terms of compelling values and morals, which are predicates to 
building the extrajudicial movements and political support necessary to 
sustain movements. Without such claims and broader support, 
educational civil rights reforms devolve into mere policy options that 
are in competition with various others. Unfortunately, a battle of 
evidence has not been and will not be enough to protect or expand 
educational civil rights. Thus, the imperative for school integration, 
school finance, English Language Learners, and disability reform is to 
reclaim and rearticulate their moral- and value-based core. Indentifying 
what those claims look like for each of those movements is the subject 
of another article, but recognizing that this work must be done is the 
only viable step to stem their trend of limited relevance. 
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